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 THE EFFECT OF REORGANIZATION 
PROCEEDINGS ON SECURITY INTERESTS: 
THE POSITION UNDER ENGLISH AND U.S. 
LAW 
Nick Segal* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
his Article outlines the laws regulating the position of secured 
creditors in both English (administration) and U.S. (Chapter 11) 
reorganization proceedings. It does so by identifying six core issues that 
define the position of a secured creditor in such proceedings, and by con-
sidering the English and U.S. approaches to each issue. By placing the 
analysis of the English and U.S. reorganization rules side by side, I have 
sought to adopt a comparative study in order to allow the similarities and 
differences of each system’s approach to be clearly seen.1 
As an initial matter, the power to appoint a receiver, and on occasions 
an administrative receiver, over substantially the whole of the debtor’s 
property remains a distinguishing feature of English law. Despite the 
general abolition of the right to appoint administrative receivers, the abil-
ity to make such appointments continues in a number of significant re-
spects—first, in relation to security agreements created before September 
15, 2003, many of which will continue in operation for many years; and 
second, because of a number of significant exceptions to the abolition of 
administrative receivership. Furthermore, both as a matter of law and 
practice, the ability to appoint other types of receiver (where the ap-
pointment is not over the whole, or substantially the whole, of the 
debtor’s property) gives secured creditors rights, and a range of practical 
options, that distinguish the English law position from that in the United 
States. This is of particular practical significance because enforcement 
rights in relation to security interests over cash and financial instruments 
(as defined by the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 
20032) are unaffected by the commencement of an administration. Hav-
ing said that, in the United Kingdom administration is increasingly used 
in preference to administrative receivership unless there is some particu-
                                                                                                             
 *  Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer. 
 1. For an excellent general comparative treatment of U.S. and English secured credit 
law, see GERARD MCCORMACK, SECURED CREDIT UNDER ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 
(2004). See also PHILIP WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY, Chapter 14 
(2d ed. 2007). 
 2. Financial Collateral Arrangements (No.2) Regulations, 2003, S.I. 2003/3226 
(Eng.). 
T 
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lar reason justifying the use of receivership. To this extent, the landscape 
in the United Kingdom will increasingly reflect that in the United States, 
insofar as a collective reorganization proceeding will be the bankruptcy 
proceeding of choice when large debtors get in to financial difficulty. 
Nevertheless, there remains a substantial and fundamental difference 
between the nature and scope of Chapter 11 proceedings and administra-
tions.3 Administrations can ultimately have only a limited effect on the 
position of secured creditors—certainly on such creditor’s right to en-
force their security (although the English courts have yet to explore the 
limits of this principle). The position in Chapter 11 is very different, 
principally because of the wide power to cram down secured creditors 
contained in section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. Further-
more, because of the court-focused and court-driven nature of Chapter 11 
proceedings, secured creditors are required to participate in a court-
managed proceeding which is designed to give all stakeholders negotiat-
ing leverage. Therefore, even though granted substantial protections by 
the Bankruptcy Code,4 secured creditors are required actively to justify 
and argue for the protection of their rights. 
However, while the protections and wide powers given to the debtor in 
Chapter 11 proceedings, along with the continuous involvement of activ-
ist bankruptcy courts, create the conditions for a strong debtor lead pro-
cedure, the Chapter 11 process has seen a number of significant changes 
in recent years, some of which are driven by law reform and some by 
market developments. Some bemoan but others applaud the fact that it is 
no longer the force it once was. Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 
made over a decade ago, have given added protections to certain classes 
                                                                                                             
 3. For a useful recent comparison between English corporate rescue and Chapter 11 
proceedings, see ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 327–28 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
 4. There are essentially three basic policies that underlie the treatment of secured 
creditors under Chapter 11. First, they are entitled to either the collateral or its full value. 
Second, for the benefit of their debtor or other creditors who might be injured by the 
repossession of their collateral, they may be required to wait for that to which they are 
entitled. Third, if secured creditors are required to wait they may be “adequately pro-
tected” against loss during their wait. There remains a fundamental policy difference 
between the English and the U.S. systems. The secured creditor’s interest in the collateral 
is commandeered by the bankruptcy system primarily to prevent two kinds of losses. 
First, a repossession might force the closing of a business that could otherwise generate 
enough income to pay not only the secured creditors but other creditors as well. Second, 
permitting a necessary liquidation of the debtor’s assets to go forward in the state courts 
may result in a windfall to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and the loss of equity in 
the property that could have been realized through a commercially reasonable bankruptcy 
sale for the debtor or other creditors. See LYNN LOPUCKI & CHRISTOPHER MIRICK, 
STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 535–638 (4th ed. 2003). 
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of creditors—labeled by critics of the reforms as “special interest 
groups”—including some secured lenders such as aircraft financiers. 
Additionally, the creditor-friendly changes introduced by the 2005 re-
forms5 have improved the position of various creditors and weakened the 
leverage of the debtor. 
These changes can be seen as compounding the trend of increasing 
creditor control, including secured creditor control. The use of tight 
covenants in post-petition financing documentation, as well as the ap-
pointment of chief restructuring officers at the instigation of creditors 
early in the Chapter 11 proceeding to support or replace existing man-
agement are two examples. Furthermore, the increase in the number of 
cases in which the debtor’s business is sold during the Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding, resulting in proceeds of sale to be distributed to secured and 
other creditors, has altered the Chapter 11 dynamic and landscape. Simi-
larly, the increasing number of pre-packaged or pre-negotiated reorgani-
zation plans (where plan terms are agreed to before the filing) have also 
had an impact.6 However, it is also worth noting that the uncertainties 
over judicial valuations in contested Chapter 11 plans has resulted in the 
weakening of the bargaining position and priority of such senior credi-
tors.7 
The automatic stay resulting from the commencement of either a Chap-
ter 11 or an administration proceeding are broadly similar as they relate 
to secured creditors. Still, the ambit of the Chapter 11 stay is clearly 
wider in a number respects. In particular, it protects the debtor from in-
formal acts to recover pre-petition claims. Additionally, while both juris-
dictions allow secured creditors relief from the automatic stay on broadly 
similar grounds, the adequate protection doctrine is more clearly articu-
lated under the Bankruptcy Code. There is a point of general significance 
to be noted here, namely that the Bankruptcy Code tends to deal in depth 
and detail with important core doctrines, while the Insolvency Act, 19868 
tends to create broad judicial discretions. Take for example the broad 
discretion to grant leave to take steps to enforce security, without any 
statutory explanation as to how the discretion should be exercised, which 
                                                                                                             
 5. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2007)). 
 6. See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Re-
main a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 153, 166 (2004). 
 7. See Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncer-
tainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930 (2006). 
 8. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45 (Eng.). 
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leaves it to the English judges to fill in the gaps in light of the purpose of 
the relevant statutory provisions.9 
English and U.S. law also differ in the protection each grants to a se-
cured creditor’s rights. While the Bankruptcy Code grants special protec-
tion to a secured creditor’s rights in cash collateral, the English system 
grants, on the one hand, more protection in respect of security over “fi-
nancial collateral” covered by the Financial Collateral Arrangements 
(No. 2) Regulations 2003 (because the moratorium which arises on an 
administration is disapplied) and, on the other hand, less protection be-
cause following the In re Spectrum decision,10 the proceeds of receiv-
ables in English law are likely to be subject only to a floating charge and 
available to the administrator to use without having to satisfy an ade-
quate protection test. 
Additionally, English law respects the after-acquired property clause in 
winding-up and administration proceedings to a greater extent than ap-
plicable U.S. law. However, the practical significance of the differences 
between the two systems is limited. In administrations, where an asset is 
acquired after the commencement of the administration, it is necessary to 
ask whether it represents property of the debtor which directly or indi-
rectly represents floating charge property disposed of by the administra-
tor. Where it does, the secured creditor is treated as continuing to have a 
floating charge over the asset. If the after-acquired property is not prop-
erty directly or indirectly representing floating charge property disposed 
of, and falls within the description of property covered by the fixed 
charge, then it continues to be subject to the fixed charge. Under U.S. 
law, if the after-acquired property represents proceeds of collateral sub-
ject to the pre-petition security interest, a security interest continues to 
attach unless the bankruptcy court orders otherwise “based on the equi-
ties of the case.” Where the Chapter 11 debtor produces a new product 
after the commencement of the case, and the materials consumed in the 
manufacturing process are subject to the lender’s pre-petition security 
interest, the bankruptcy court usually has no basis for invoking its equi-
table power to limit the security interest, so the security interest will con-
tinue. This is the same position which applies to the proceeds of floating 
charge property in an English administration. However, where a post-
                                                                                                             
 9. This difference in approach can also be seen in the context of reorganization plans 
that allow the variation or discharge of the rights of creditors, including secured creditors. 
In England, the entire statutory regime dealing with schemes of arrangement is only three 
sections long and most of the law (including the rules regulating the limits of majority 
voting power) is judge made. This approach may be difficult to sustain in the face of 
increasing numbers of contentious and contested schemes involving bondholders. 
 10. In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.). 
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petition product is made using assets or cash not previously subject to the 
lender’s security interest, the new product will not be subject to the 
lender’s lien. This is different from the position in an English administra-
tion, although, arguably, the position is the same in an English winding 
up which divests the debtor of the beneficial interest its property.11 It is at 
least arguable that upon the commencement of the winding up, such as-
sets become subject to a statutory trust so that products created therefrom 
or their proceeds are not property of the debtor to which the security in-
terest can attach. 
In an English administration, the debtor has the power to “dispose of or 
take action relating to” floating charge property, which, in the post- 
Spectrum world, can often be expected to include receivables and book 
debts, without the need for a court order or permission from the secured 
creditor. In a Chapter 11 proceeding, there is a distinction made between 
cash collateral and non-cash collateral. Unless the secured creditor con-
sents to the use of the cash collateral by the debtor, it may not be used 
unless the court is satisfied that the secured party’s interest is adequately 
protected. The debtor may, however, use, sell, or lease non-cash collat-
eral in the ordinary course of its business without obtaining court ap-
proval. If a lender is concerned about his position, he needs to file a re-
quest with the court for adequate protection. 
In an English administration, the secured creditor will find that his 
floating charge security interest is subordinated to the costs and expenses 
of the administration, while his fixed charge is not subject to such costs 
and expenses. However, in a Chapter 11 proceeding, the secured creditor 
is always subject to the risk of a surcharge because the Bankruptcy Code 
permits the debtor to recover administrative expenses from a secured 
creditor’s collateral where they are necessary to preserve or dispose of 
the collateral, are reasonable, and provide a benefit to the secured credi-
tor. Furthermore, one of the conditions to the confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization is that the holder of administrative expense claims will be 
paid in full in cash so that a secured lender can find that his rights have 
been changed by the plan despite his opposition (as a result of the cram 
down provisions)12 and that the administrative expenses of the Chapter 
11 case are paid in full on the effective date of the Chapter 11 plan. Fur-
thermore, the secured creditor’s pre-petition security interest could be 
primed and subordinated to new security granted in respect of post-
                                                                                                             
 11. See Ayerst v. C. & K. (Construction) Ltd., [1976] A.C. 167 (H.L.). 
 12. Perhaps he has been forced to accept the indubitable equivalent of his pre-petition 
security interest. 
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petition financing, where the pre-petition secured creditor’s security in-
terest is adequately protected. 
As already noted, there is a very substantial difference between English 
and U.S. law in relation to majority voting and cram-down—that is, the 
ability to vary or discharge the rights of secured creditors without the 
consent of each affected creditor. In England, in an administration and 
company voluntary arrangement (CVA), the secured creditor’s right to 
enforce his security is entrenched and cannot be prejudiced by the ad-
ministrator’s proposals or the terms of the CVA, without the consent of 
the secured creditor. No such protection arises with respect to schemes of 
arrangement.13 However, English law does not have a true equivalent to 
the cram-down that arises in Chapter 11 proceedings. There is no ability 
to impose a plan on a class of impaired creditors who are made a party to 
a scheme of arrangement without the consent of the class as a whole. If 
the class votes to approve the scheme by the requisite majority, each 
member of the class may be bound. However, Chapter 11 allows, subject 
to satisfying the cram-down criteria contained in section 1129(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, an impaired class to be bound by the plan even though 
the class as a whole has voted against the plan.14 It is true that the Eng-
lish courts have added their own gloss to the statutory provisions dealing 
with schemes by holding that where a class of creditors have no eco-
nomic interest in the debtor, they need not be consulted and their votes 
on the scheme can be disregarded.15 Furthermore, the test for determin-
ing whether or not a class of creditors has an economic interest has been 
held to be what the relevant class would receive in the event that the 
debtor was wound up and the assets sold and distributed in a liquida-
tion.16 This approach is controversial. First, there is currently a contro-
versy as to the basis on which the debtor’s assets should be valued for 
determining whether a class of creditors has an economic interest. The 
approach to valuation questions adopted in Chapter 11 proceedings for 
                                                                                                             
 13. A class of secured creditors could have their rights varied pursuant to a scheme of 
arrangement to which the class was a party if seventy-five percent in value and a majority 
in number of the class voted in favor of the scheme and the court sanctioned it.  
 14. Note that it is also not necessary for the impaired class actually to vote on the 
plan. While it is necessary that a least one other impaired class of creditors has voted in 
favor of the plan, where a class is totally impaired and the plan provides that members of 
that class will not receive or retain any property under the plan on account of their claims, 
the class is deemed to reject the plan. Where an impaired class needs to be crammed-
down, the absolute priority rule is triggered and the plan may be confirmed over the op-
position of an impaired class if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and 
equitable. See 11 U.S.C § 1129(b)(1). 
 15. See In re MyTravel Group Plc., [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2365 (C.A.). 
 16. See id. at 2386–88. 
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the purpose of testing whether a Chapter 11 plan is consistent with the 
absolute priority rule has been prayed in aid by junior classes of creditors 
who wish to have the debtor’s business valued on the basis of a going 
concern enterprise value. In addition, there is some uncertainty as to the 
legal basis for the rule that allows the court to disregard classes of credi-
tors with no economic interest. The statutory provisions in the Compa-
nies Act of 198517 include no such power. Insofar as the court is exercis-
ing its discretion at the required hearing to sanction a scheme of ar-
rangement approved by the requisite majorities of creditors, there seems 
to be a proper basis for considering whether creditors who have not been 
made a party to the scheme, and who receive no benefits thereunder, 
have been fairly treated and a test based on the absence of an economic 
interest in the estate makes sense. However, it seems more difficult to 
justify a rule that allows the court to impose the plan on a class of credi-
tors who have been made a party to the scheme and voted against it. 
There are, in addition, differences between the rules in the United 
States and England governing the circumstances in which pre-bankruptcy 
secured transactions can be set aside as fraudulent transfers, preferences, 
or transactions at an undervalue. I have not, however, considered these 
differences (partly because I primarily wanted to pay attention primarily 
to the way in which secured creditors participate in Chapter 11 and ad-
ministration proceedings).  
I have focused on the operation and effect of the administration and 
Chapter 11 regimes as they relate to secured creditors and not sought to 
address the wider debate concerning the policy and principle justifica-
tions for the treatment of secured creditors under each system. There is, 
of course,  extensive literature, mainly in the United States, on policy 
justifications for priority given to secured creditors.18 
II. THE ENGLISH LAW BACKGROUND—RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FIXED AND FLOATING CHARGES 
The secured creditor, particularly the secured creditor holding security 
interests over the whole, or substantially the whole, of the debtor’s prop-
                                                                                                             
 17. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6 (Eng.). 
 18. For a useful collection of U.S. materials, see BARRY E. ADLER, FOUNDATIONS OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 23–54 (2005); see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of 
Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004) (containing useful comparative mate-
rial and a discussion of the English and U.S. regimes). For an English perspective and 
excellent citation of the literature in the United States and England, see RIZWAAN JAMEEL 
MOKAL, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: THEORY AND APPLICATION 133–87 (2005). 
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erty,19 has traditionally enjoyed great freedom of action under English 
law. For example, the secured creditor has had the benefit of a wide 
range of contractually defined and self-help remedies which were capa-
ble of being exercised without the involvement of a court, and which re-
mained exercisable even after the commencement of reorganisation pro-
ceedings. In England, the reorganization proceeding is the administration 
procedure (which, unlike its U.S. counterpart—Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code—can normally only be commenced upon a finding or decla-
ration that the debtor is, or is likely to become, insolvent).20 
However, there have been a number of significant changes in English 
law in recent years that have impacted the secured creditor’s position in 
an administration proceeding.21 Three are particularly noteworthy: (1) 
the Enterprise Act 2002;22 (2) the Financial Collateral Arrangements 
(No.2) Regulations 2003 (implementing the E.U. Collateral Directive); 
and (3) the House of Lords judgment in In re Spectrum Plus Ltd.23 
A. The Enterprise Act 
The Enterprise Act has qualified and significantly reduced the ability 
of a secured creditor both to enforce its security interest following the 
                                                                                                             
 19. A key concept of English insolvency law after 1986 is that of the administrative 
receiver. An administrative receiver is “a receiver or manager of the whole (or substan-
tially the whole) of a company’s property appointed by or on behalf of the holders of any 
debentures of the company secured by a charge which, as created, was a floating charge, 
or by such a charge and one or more other securities.” Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 
29(2). In order to have the full protection and benefit of English insolvency law, a se-
cured creditor needs to have an asset security which gives it the right to appoint an ad-
ministrative receiver. The term “qualifying floating charge” is also important in this con-
text and means: “a floating charge . . . created by an instrument which . . . purports to 
empower the holder of the floating charge to appoint an administrator of the company, 
[or] purports to empower the holder of the floating charge to make an appointment which 
would be the appointment of an administrative receiver.” Id. c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 
14(2). 
 20. There is, however no requirement of actual or impending insolvency in relation to 
an out of court appointment of an administrator by the holder by a qualifying floating 
charge. 
 21. It is also worth noting, by way of introduction, that there has been extensive pres-
sure for the reform of the English law of security interests. A series of substantial reports 
have been prepared—for example, by the Company Law Steering Group and the Law 
Commission—recommending changes to the English system, including a change to a 
notice filing system. See, e.g., LAW COMMISSION, PUBL’N NO. 296, COMPANY SECURITY 
INTERESTS (2005) (Eng.). To date however, the Government has refused to implement the 
proposed changes. 
 22. Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40. 
 23. In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.). 
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commencement of an administration proceeding and to block the com-
mencement of such a proceeding. However, such secured creditors retain 
a privileged and strong position within the administration proceeding.24 
B. The Financial Collateral Arrangements (No.2) Regulations 2003 
The Financial Collateral Arrangements (No.2) Regulations have im-
proved the position of secured creditors where they have security over 
the types of collateral covered by the Regulations25—cash or financial 
instruments including shares, bonds, and any other securities which are 
“normally dealt in” and which give the right to acquire such shares or 
bonds.26 The Regulations disapply certain provisions of the administra-
tion proceeding regime, including the moratorium on the enforcement of 
security, the ability of the administrator to deal with financial instru-
ments subject to fixed and floating charge security, as well as some of 
the claw-back provisions that are triggered by the commencement of an 
administration. However, transaction at an undervalue and preference 
rules still apply. 
C. The Spectrum decision 
While the Regulations represent a positive development for secured 
creditors, the House of Lords decision in In re Spectrum represents a re-
treat and reduction in their protection in administration proceedings. 
While the precise impact of the decision remains to be established, for 
                                                                                                             
 24. See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing how secured creditors retain a privileged and 
strong position within the administration proceeding). 
 25. Note that one of the requirements that needs to be satisfied for the Regulations to 
apply is that the collateral must be in the possession or under the control of the collateral-
taker. The Regulations are, however, silent as to what constitutes possession or control in 
this context. It is unclear whether an equitable charge or a floating charge (certainly be-
fore crystallization) are covered. Note also that, the Regulations provide that the right of a 
collateral-provider to substitute equivalent financial collateral or to remove excess finan-
cial collateral will not prevent the financial collateral being in the possession or under the 
control of the collateral taker. See GEOFFREY FULLER, CORPORATE BORROWING: LAW AND 
PRACTICE 78–80 (3d ed. 2006). 
 26. The ambit of the definition of “financial instruments” is wide, covering: 
(a) shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in companies; 
(b) bonds and other forms of instruments giving rise to or acknowledging in-
debtedness if these are tradable on the capital market; and (c) any other securi-
ties which are normally dealt in and which give the right to acquire any such 
shares, bonds, instruments or other securities by subscription, purchase or ex-
change or which give rise to a cash settlement (excluding instruments of pay-
ment). 
Financial Collateral Arrangements (No.2) Regulations 2003, § 3. 
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present purposes it can be taken to establish the rule that most security 
interests over debts and receivables will be treated as floating, and not 
fixed, charges. This has a significant impact in relation to administration 
since an administrator has the ability to “dispose of or take action relat-
ing to property which is subject to a floating charge as if it were not sub-
ject to the charge.”27 However, where property is disposed of by the ad-
ministrator, the floating charge holder has the same priority over ac-
quired property as he had over the disposed property. The combination of 
this provision of the Enterprise Act and the In re Spectrum decision 
means that in many cases, administrators will now have access to funds 
to cover the costs of the administration without the need to obtain the 
consent of the secured creditor. This is an area in which the secured 
creditor in the United States has a stronger position than his counterpart 
in England. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor “may not use, sell, or 
lease cash collateral . . . unless each entity that has an interest in such 
cash collateral consents,” or the court grants permission based on its sat-
isfaction that the debtor has provided adequate protection of the secured 
creditor’s interest.28 
D. Fixed and Floating Security Interests 
In order to understand the impact of bankruptcy proceedings on secu-
rity interests under English law, it is necessary to take account of the cru-
cial distinction between fixed and floating security interests. Charges29 
may be fixed or floating. A fixed charge is one which attaches as soon as 
the charge has been created, or the debtor has acquired rights in the asset 
to be charged, whichever is the later. The effect of this is that the debtor 
cannot dispose of the asset free from the charge without the chargee’s 
consent except by satisfying the indebtedness secured by the charge. The 
floating charge, by contrast, is one which hovers over a designated class 
                                                                                                             
 27. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 70(1). 
 28. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (2007). 
 29. The term “charge” is used in this Article as a general description of security inter-
ests under English law. While the terms “charge” and “mortgage” are often used inter-
changeably, there is technically an important distinction between the two concepts. A 
mortgage is a transfer of ownership to the creditor by way of security upon the express or 
implied condition that the asset shall be reconveyed to the debtor when the sum secured 
has been paid. An equitable charge, however, does not involve the transfer either of pos-
session or of ownership, but constitutes the right of the creditor, created either by trust or 
by contract, to have a designated asset of the debtor appropriated to the discharge of the 
indebtedness. The right is satisfied out of the proceeds of sale of the asset, where the sale 
results from the debtor’s voluntary act or takes place under a court order for sale or the 
appointment of the receiver made on application of the chargee. See ROY GOODE, COM-
MERCIAL LAW 586–87 (3d ed. 2004). 
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of assets in which the debtor has or will in the future acquire an interest. 
The debtor has liberty to deal with any of the assets free from the charge 
so long as it remains floating. When an event occurs which causes the 
charge to crystallize, it attaches as a fixed security to all the assets then 
comprised in the relevant class and to any assets of the specified descrip-
tion subsequently acquired by the debtor. Banks and other secured lend-
ers in England will frequently be granted an all assets debenture contain-
ing both a fixed and a floating charge. The former covers fixed assets and 
debts (such as land, intellectual property rights, equipment, shares, and 
important major contracts), while the latter covers the remaining types of 
assets such as stock in trade (inventory). In this way, the secured creditor 
is granted a security interest over all of the debtor’s property from time 
to time. Additionally, the secured creditor is given the right to enforce 
the security by appointing a receiver under the fixed and floating 
charges. The receiver, as agent for the debtor, is authorized to take pos-
session of the debtor’s assets (and business), continue the debtor’s busi-
ness, and sell its assets to repay the secured debt. 
Various consequences flow from creating or characterizing a charge as 
a floating charge. For example, a floating charge is postponed to the 
rights of preferential creditors if the secured creditor takes possession of 
any of the charged assets, or in the event that the company goes into re-
ceivership, liquidation, or administration.30 In addition, a floating 
charge—given by an insolvent company within the twelve months prior 
to the onset of insolvency—is void, except as to new value.31 Further-
more, all floating charges given by a company are required to be regis-
tered.32 
The last thirty years has seen a debate raging in England in relation to 
the proper characterization of charges over book debts, particularly 
charges taken by banks labeled in the security documentation as “fixed 
charges,” but operated in a manner that allows the debtor to pay proceeds 
into its ordinary bank account and use them in the ordinary course of 
business. In some respects, the debate in the English courts reflects the 
                                                                                                             
 30. A fixed charge, on the other hand, has priority over all unsecured claims, prefer-
ential or otherwise. The Enterprise Act 2002 reduced significantly the range of preferen-
tial debts by abolishing the government’s preferential status. See Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 
40, § 251. Formerly, sums payable to the Crown were preferential. This preference had 
been criticized for many years as causing hardship to the general body of creditors while 
producing benefits insignificant in terms of total government receipts. 
 31. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 245. 
 32. A fixed charge is registerable only if taken over a class of asset listed in section 
396 of the Companies Act 1985, or if it would have been registerable as a bill of sale if 
granted by an individual. 
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twists and turns that took place in U.S. jurisprudence relating to the va-
lidity of security interests created for the purpose of accounts receivable 
financing and of chattel mortgages on stock in trade following the Su-
preme Court decision in Benedict v. Ratner.33 
In that case, Justice Brandeis34 had to consider an arrangement in 
which the debtor agreed to assign to the creditor its present and future 
accounts receivable as security for a loan. A list of all the accounts out-
standing at the date of the loan was delivered to the secured creditor with 
a comparable list delivered each succeeding month. Under its arrange-
ments with the secured creditor, the debtor continued to collect the ac-
counts and use the proceeds as it saw fit. It did not account to the secured 
creditor, nor were the account debtors notified of the assignment.35 Sub-
sequently, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against the debtor, and 
Benedict was appointed receiver of the debtor and took over collection of 
the remaining accounts. The secured creditor petitioned in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings that the receiver be required to pay him the balance 
of his loan from the proceeds of the assigned receivables. Resisting that 
petition, the receiver cross-petitioned that the secured creditor be re-
quired to turn over to the estate the receivables which the debtor had re-
mitted to him previously as well as any proceeds he might have col-
lected.36 
The District Court and the Second Circuit held in favor of the secured 
creditor. However, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Justice 
Brandeis, stating the facts, noted that “there was no finding of fraud in 
fact.”37 Having concluded that the parties’ rights depended mainly on 
New York law, he formulated the basic legal proposition which deter-
mined the decision: 
Under the law of New York a transfer of property as security which re-
serves to the transferor the right to dispose of the same, or to apply the 
proceeds thereof, for his own uses, is, as to creditors, fraudulent in law 
and void.38 
                                                                                                             
 33. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925). 
 34. For those interested in finding out more about the attitudes, approach, and impact 
of Justice Brandeis, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000). 
 35. Ratner, 268 U.S. at 358. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 360–61. For an excellent account of the impact of the rule in Benedict v. 
Ratner, see 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 250–86 
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As Professor Gilmore has pointed out, after Benedict v. Ratner, a 
lender was required to exercise “dominion” over his security.39 What 
came to be accepted as the proper way of asserting dominion in non-
notification financing was a requirement that the proceeds of collection 
be remitted daily by the assignor to the assignee. Nothing was to go di-
rectly into the assignor’s bank account; all checks, notes, and accep-
tances had to be endorsed and delivered to the assignee. Of course, fol-
lowing the remittance there would be what was sometimes referred as a 
“re-remittance;” after having passed through the assignee’s hands, the 
proceeds would end up in the assignor’s bank account. Since receivables 
were typically assigned to secure a working capital loan, it was necessary 
that the proceeds eventually be made available for the assignor’s use. But 
under the rule in Benedict v. Ratner, it was fatal for the assignor to take 
the proceeds immediately; they had to be channeled into his bank ac-
count through the assignee. 
These developments sound very familiar to the English lawyer who has 
seen the twists, turns, and agonizing in English case law concerning the 
characterization of purportedly fixed charges over debts taken by banks, 
starting with the Siebe Gorman v. Barclays Bank decision in 1979.40 The 
subsequent debate has not related to whether the debtor has or has not 
created a security interest at all, but whether the security interest was a 
fixed or floating charge. Justice Brandeis’ opinion denies the availability 
of any kind of security interest where the debtor has the power to deal 
with the collateral without the consent of the secured lender. As a conse-
quence, U.S. law never developed a judicial concept of the equitable 
floating charge, and from 1925 until the advent of Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code in 196241 effectively did without floating liens.42 
 
(1965). The Benedict v. Ratner decision confirmed a previous line of authority in New 
York. See, e.g., Zartman v. First Nat’l Bank of Waterloo, 189 N.Y. 267 (1907). 
 39. GILMORE, supra note 38, at 260; see also MCCORMACK, supra note 1, at 108–10 
(discussing the “sophisticated avoidance industry” that developed after Benedict v. Rat-
ner to permit large scale receivables and other financing and the separate legislative ini-
tiatives in various states). 
 40. Siebe Gorman & Co. v. Barclays Bank [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 142 (Ch.). 
 41.  The Uniform Commercial Code creates the functional equivalent of a floating 
charge. Article 9-205 states that: 
(a) A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors solely be-
cause: 
(1) the debtor has the right or ability to: 
(A) Use, commingle, or dispose of all or part of the collateral . . . ; 
(B) Collect, compromise, enforce or otherwise deal with the collateral; 
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In the English context, banks have been concerned to show that restric-
tions in their debentures have established their charges as fixed, while 
liquidators have been equally astute to seek to strike their charges down 
as unregistered floating charges or establish that they were only floating 
charges. This resulted in a substantial volume of litigation after the Siebe 
Gorman decision held that it was possible to take a fixed charge over 
book debts. The House of Lords in In re Spectrum has since overruled 
Siebe Gorman, holding that a secured creditor43 only had a floating 
charge over debts where the secured lender’s security agreement placed 
no restriction on the use that the debtor could make of the collected debts 
paid into the company’s ordinary operating account with the secured 
lender. Accordingly, although the security agreement purported to grant 
the secured lender a fixed charge in law, it granted only a floating 
charge, which did not have priority over the claims of preferential credi-
tors. 
A debate still rages as to the correct approach to take following the de-
cision in the House of Lords, as well as the nature and extent of restric-
tions which must be imposed by secured lenders on the debtor’s use of 
proceeds of debts in order to successfully create a fixed charge.44 This is 
not the place in which to debate at further length what the correct ap-
proach is, though an approach consistent with the rule in Benedict v. Rat-
ner would certainly satisfy the In re Spectrum test. Furthermore, it is 
 
. . . 
(D) Use, commingle, or dispose of the proceeds; or 
(2) the secured creditor fails to require the debtor to account for proceeds or re-
place collateral. 
U.C.C. § 9-205 (2000). 
 42. Joshua Getzler notes that the decision to exclude floating charges arguably may 
have enhanced rather than degraded disciplined lending, and strengthened the manage-
ment and monitoring of debtor companies in the United States by requiring notice to 
assignees of changes in the collateral and giving chargees a strong legal incentive to po-
lice the debtor’s business less priority be postponed. Joshua Getzler, The Role of Security 
Over Future and Circulating Capital: Evidence from the British Economy Circa 1850–
1920, in JOSHUA GETZLER & JENNIFER PAYNE, COMPANY CHARGES: SPECTRUM AND 
BEYOND 227, 250 (2006). 
 43. In In re Spectrum, the secured creditor was a commercial bank with whom the 
debtor maintained its ordinary bank accounts, and into which debtor proceeds were paid 
and withdrawn without restriction. See In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. [2005] 2 A.C. 680, 680 
(H.L.). 
 44. See generally Gabriel Moss, Fictions and Floating Charges: Some Reflections on 
the House of Lords’ decision in Spectrum, in JOSHUA GETZLER & JENNIFER PAYNE, 
COMPANY CHARGES: SPECTRUM AND BEYOND 1 (2006). Gabriel Moss was lead counsel 
for the bank in the Spectrum case, and was originally instructed by me! 
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probably the case that nothing short of a requirement that the debtor pay 
proceeds of book debts into a blocked account—from which withdrawals 
can only be made with the consent from time to time of the secured 
lender—will be sufficient.45 
E. Failure to Develop Floating Charges in U.S. Law 
In this context, it is interesting to note and impossible to avoid quoting 
at length the trenchant comments of Dr. Gough concerning the historical 
development of U.S. law relating to security interests over present and 
future receivables. In Company Charges,46 Dr. Gough explains: 
United States law never developed the equitable floating charge. In the 
early seventeenth century, the English common law, as it existed in the 
time of Lord Coke, was exported to North America. The law as ex-
pressed in Bacon’s Maxim considered then and now that it is impossi-
ble to sell or mortgage future property, which is not presently owned, 
because there was nothing to convey. English equity in the nineteenth 
century made the conceptual advance that a mortgage over future prop-
erty could be effective, without new legal action where the property 
was subsequently acquired. A contract to assign property, supported by 
money consideration, meant that title in equity passed automatically on 
the subsequent acquisition. The effectiveness of a charge over future 
property made it possible for the English equity courts then to invent 
the floating charge by making the further mental quantum leap by say-
ing that the future property subject to the charge could change from 
time to time. This was vital to achiever an effective security over circu-
lating business assets. 
Meanwhile, the courts of the American states still remained hidebound 
by seventeenth century common law prohibitions, unable to overcome 
conceptual constraints in regard to security over future property. In the 
1920’s, in the New York case of Benedict v. Ratner, a security of pre-
sent and future accounts receivable was as a matter of judicial policy 
struck down for the reason that the trading power of the company 
debtor to continue carrying on business by dealing with assets subject 
to the mortgage was considered incompatible with the notion of a pro-
prietary right arising by way of mortgage in favor of the creditor. Be-
cause the mortgagee could exercise no control over the mortgaged as-
sets by taking possession or requiring the debtor specifically to account 
for them it was held that there could be no security in existence. For 
good measure, the court linked the reservation by the mortgagor of a 
                                                                                                             
 45. It may well be possible to have debts paid into a blocked account from which 
withdrawals are rarely made at the same time as the level of borrowings by the debtor 
debited to another account are allowed to increase. 
 46. WILLIAM JAMES GOUGH, COMPANY CHARGES (2d ed.1996). 
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right to dispose of the mortgaged assets or apply their proceeds for its 
own use with bankruptcy law principles, by saying that this arrange-
ment created a conclusive presumption of fraud against creditors and 
therefore that the mortgage assignment was void. In consequence, the 
Americans had to create a stock-in-trade security in the form of a secu-
rity interest over ‘inventory plus proceeds’ through the introduction of 
legislation. This fundamental legal reform was ultimately introduced in 
America in 1951 with the promulgation of the first edition of the now 
famous Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Americans 
only then achieved by legislative code, containing a complex set of pri-
ority provisions, a security somewhat equivalent to that invented in 
England by the courts of equity nearly a century before. 
Traditionally, America never developed bank all assets security secur-
ing all moneys under multiple credit lines typical in the English and 
Australian context of branch banking. Article 9 was necessary in Amer-
ica to provide by legislation an all assets business security, effective for 
stock-in-trade financing purposes, which was prohibited under its 
common law. American credit and security techniques placed far 
greater emphasis on dedicated credit lines financing the acquisition of 
particular classes of assets. American law and practice had a far greater 
preoccupation with title security and purchase-money security interests. 
The elaborate statutory priority rules developed in Article 9 and the 
purchase-money super-priority naturally reflected these different 
American perceptions and needs. Legal deficiency in relation to all as-
sets security was not true in England and Australasia, which developed 
a different system of credit and security law and practice, with the 
branch banking system and the floating charge being very significant 
differentiating features. England and Australasia developed in the float-
ing charge a convenient form of business security over stock-in-trade, 
book debts and other circulating assets. The Anglo-Australasian juris-
dictions did not need to enact an Article 9 to enable the taking of all as-
sets security.47 
III. THE CORE ISSUES—SIX POINTS OF COMPARISON 
A. Secured Creditor’s Rights of Enforcement 
1. Secured Creditors’ Rights of Enforcement Under English Law 
In English law, the position has been radically altered following the 
implementation of the Enterprise Act 2002 in September 2003. Subject 
to the exceptions mentioned below, secured creditors with security inter-
ests covering the whole or substantially the whole of the debtor’s prop-
                                                                                                             
47 Id. at 437–38. 
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erty are no longer able to appoint an administrative receiver, and thereby 
take control, albeit indirectly, of the realization of the collateral upon 
enforcement or following the debtor’s commencement of an administra-
tion proceeding. 
Previously, a secured creditor with a security interest including a float-
ing charge in the whole or substantially the whole of the debtor’s prop-
erty could block the commencement by the debtor (or another creditor) 
of an administration proceeding by appointing an administrative receiver. 
The court had no jurisdiction to make an administration order in the 
event that the secured creditor had already appointed an administrative 
receiver. Administrative receivership was essentially a debt enforcement 
mechanism for the benefit of the secured creditor who appoints the re-
ceiver. The primary function of the administrative receiver was to take 
control of the debtor’s property and effect such disposals as would result 
in payment of the amount due under the security instrument after allow-
ing for the administrative receiver’s remuneration and any sums payable 
out of floating charge realizations to preferential creditors.48 Accord-
ingly, the debtor was unable to prevent (by commencing an insolvency 
proceeding) such a secured creditor from enforcing its security and hav-
ing management of, and undertaking the process of, selling or otherwise 
realizing, its assets and business (in so far as they were subject to the se-
curity interest). The Enterprise Act 2002, however, largely abolished the 
institution of administrative receivership, except in the case of charges 
made before September 15, 2003 and charges exempted from the aboli-
tion.49 
The holder of a fixed and floating charge over the whole or substan-
tially the whole of the debtor’s property is now prevented from appoint-
ing an administrative receiver. This is true in spite of any provision in the 
charge which purports to authorize such an appointment. Instead, the 
legislation now contemplates that the floating chargeholder will normally 
enforce the security by commencing an administration proceeding. The 
administration regime has been changed to reflect this development. The 
quid pro quo for the abolition of the right to appoint an administrative 
receiver is that the chargee enjoys a number of privileges in an admini-
stration not available to others. 
                                                                                                             
 48. The receiver owes a primary duty of care to the secured creditor who appointed 
him, as well as a limited, secondary duty of care to the debtor. 
 49. The exemptions cover certain important categories of transaction, including capi-
tal market arrangements involving a debt of at least £50 million, public-private partner-
ships, utility projects, urban regeneration projects, and project finance transactions that 
meet certain criteria. See Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40. 
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First, the holder of a qualifying floating charge is given the right to ap-
point an administrator, chosen by him, merely by serving a notice at 
court with the requisite statutory declaration. Indeed, the chargeholder is 
able to secure an interim moratorium for up to five business days by fil-
ing a notice of intention to appoint an administrator. However, a default 
or other event is necessary to entitle the chargeholder to enforce the secu-
rity interest. The secured creditor is also able, like any other creditor, to 
make an application to the court for an administration order. Where the 
holder of a qualifying floating charge makes a requisite statement in its 
application to court, there is an exception to the general rule that the 
court can only make an administration order where it is satisfied that the 
debtor is or is likely to become insolvent. Second, whilst the debtor or its 
directors cannot appoint an administrator out of court, where a petition 
for winding-up has been presented or an administration application has 
been made to the court and the petition or application has not been dis-
posed of, no such restriction applies to an appointment by the holder of a 
qualifying floating charge. Third, where the debtor is in compulsory 
winding-up (but not in voluntary winding-up) the chargeholder may 
make an administration application. If the application is granted, the 
court is required to discharge the winding up order. Finally, the holder of 
qualifying floating charge who makes an out of court appointment is 
given the facility of filing the notice of appointment with the court out-
side court business hours—a point of some considerable practical sig-
nificance. 
2. Secured Creditors’ Rights of Enforcement Under U.S. Law 
In modern U.S. law and practice, when a major corporation finds itself 
in financial difficulty, it will file for Chapter 11 protection and will be 
able to stay all enforcement action by secured creditors. There is no en-
forcement mechanism, such as administrative receivership, which offers 
a secured creditor the right to initiate and control the process of manag-
ing and realizing collateral independent of the bankruptcy proceeding.  
If the collateral is personal property or fixtures, Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.) gives the secured creditor enforcement 
rights, including the right to take possession of the collateral after de-
fault.50 The secured creditor is given the right, after default, to take pos-
session of the collateral either with or without a judicial process.51 In ad-
dition, the secured creditor has the right to “sell, lease, license, or other-
                                                                                                             
 50. U.C.C. § 9-609 (2000). 
 51. The secured creditor can only proceed without judicial process if it can do so 
without a breach of the peace. Id. § 9-609(b)(2). 
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wise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or fol-
lowing any commercially reasonable preparation or proceeding.”52 If the 
collateral is realty, the secured creditor can proceed within the frame-
work of the appropriate state mortgage or deed of trust foreclosure stat-
ues. 
Prior to the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, a secured 
creditor is given various enforcement options depending on the nature of 
the collateral. The U.C.C. governs the exercise of enforcement remedies 
following default in relation to personal property and fixtures. These in-
clude the right to repossess the collateral where tangible personality is 
involved. In relation to collateral in the form of obligations owed to the 
debtor by third parties (accounts receivable, executory contract rights, 
general intangibles, chattel paper, or negotiable instruments) the secured 
creditor has a right of direct collection.53 In addition, the secured creditor 
has the right to effect a foreclosure sale.54 
Despite the fact that corporate reorganizations in the United States be-
gan in the nineteenth century with railroad failures and court appoint-
ment of receivers in enforcement actions by secured creditors,55 U.S. law 
never developed the concept of the private, out of court, receivership. 
This can be attributed in part to the failure to develop the floating charge 
concept, and in part to the codification of secured creditors’ enforcement 
rights under the U.C.C. (which did not include the right). 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. § 9-610(a). This includes the right of the secured creditor to purchase the col-
lateral itself either at a public disposition or pursuant to a private disposition (“only if the 
collateral is of a kind that is customarily sold on a recognized market or the subject of 
widely distributed standard price quotations”). Id. § 9-610(c). 
 53. Id. § 9-607. Where the original assignment of accounts receivable is on a notifica-
tion basis, the secured creditor has the right to make direct collections even before de-
fault. However, if the assignment of the accounts receivable or other third party obliga-
tion is on a non-notification basis—as with a simple security interest in accounts—the 
secured creditor is not entitled to notify the account debtors to make payment until the 
debtor defaults. 
 54. Id. § 9-610. In the United States, a sale by a secured creditor following the 
debtor’s default is often referred to as a foreclosure sale. This is different from strict fore-
closure under English law, where the secured creditor retains and takes title to the collat-
eral in satisfaction of the secured obligations. 
 55. For an excellent treatment of the history of U.S. bankruptcy law, see DAVID 
SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 17–18, 48–70 
(2001). 
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B. The Automatic Stay 
1. The Automatic Stay Under English Law 
Upon the commencement of an administration56 without the consent of 
the administrator or permission of the court, “no step may be taken to 
enforce security over the company’s property.”57 The prohibition on the 
enforcement of security by a creditor contains a number of component 
parts.  
First, no step may be taken to enforce security. The phrase “taking 
steps” was considered in detail by the Court of Appeal in Bristol Airport 
Plc. v. Powdrill.58 There, the phrase was given a wide meaning and was 
held to include a refusal—by those in possession of a chattel who 
claimed a right of retention over it—to comply with a request from an 
administrator to deliver up the chattel. This was so even though the re-
fusal involved no positive action by the creditor. Accordingly, in the case 
of an ordinary possessory lien under English law, the assertion by the 
lien holder of a right to retain does constitute the taking of a step to en-
force security (i.e., the lien), and therefore, in the absence of the adminis-
trator’s agreement, requires the permission of the court. However, no 
steps are treated as being taken to enforce the security in this context be-
fore a demand for delivery of the chattel is made by the administrator. In 
addition, even after a demand for delivery has been made, the lien holder 
has a reasonable time in which to verify the administrator’s right to pos-
session. 
It remains arguable that the exercise of the contractual right—as part of 
the process of enforcement of security—may amount to a “step.” For 
example, if a necessary condition precedent to the enforcement of secu-
rity is the exercise of a right to terminate rights and obligations under a 
contract (e.g., a bank’s obligation to make further advances) by service 
of a particular notice or the acceleration of the debtor’s obligations by the 
making of a demand for repayment, and the purpose of the exercise of 
the right and service of the notice is to enable the security to be enforced 
(that is, is with a view to such enforcement and as a necessary link in the 
chain of events leading to enforcement), then there is an argument that 
serving the notice is a step.59 However, in most cases a problem will not 
                                                                                                             
 56. An automatic interim moratorium also applies to the debtor after an application 
for an administration order has been made, but the administration order has not been 
granted or dismissed. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 44(1). 
 57. Id., c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 43. 
 58. Bristol Airport Plc. v. Powdrill, [1990] Ch. 744. 
 59. This was a point which the judge refused to decide in relation to a hire purchase 
agreement in Re David Meek Plant Ltd., [1994] 1 B.C.L.C. 680, 684 (Ch.). The point was 
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arise since the exercise of such a contractual right will not interfere with 
the administrator’s rights or ability to deal with a particular asset. Where 
this is not so, it is possible that permission will be required. 
Secondly, there must be an enforcement of security; what is being done 
must constitute an enforcement of the security interest. Thirdly, a step 
must be taken to enforce a “security.” This is defined in section 248 of 
the Insolvency Act of 1986 to mean “any mortgage, charge, lien or other 
security.”60 It seems from the categories of “security” identified in the 
definition that only true security interests are covered, or those interests 
giving proprietary rights in assets belonging to the debtor (or in which 
the debtor has an interest). Thus, rights which have the same function as 
security, but do not create proprietary rights in an asset of the debtor 
(such as set-off) are not included. 
The secured creditor may take steps to enforce his security interest 
where the administrator grants his consent or the court grants leave. The 
Insolvency Act 1986 does not establish explicitly the basis on which the 
court is to exercise its discretion to grant leave to lift the stay. However, 
the case law suggests that English law has developed an approach similar 
to the U.S. “adequate protection” doctrine. 
The Court of Appeal in In re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc. recog-
nized that the automatic stay is “intended to assist the [debtor], under the 
management of the administrator, to achieve the purpose for which the 
administration order was made.”61 Therefore, the court held that leave 
should be given where the creditor seeks to exercise his proprietary 
rights, and the creditor’s action is unlikely to impede the achievement of 
that purpose.62 However, in other cases, the court went on to say that it: 
has to carry out a balancing exercise, balancing the legitimate interests 
of the [creditor] and the legitimate interests of the other creditors . . . . 
In carrying out the balancing exercise, great importance or weight is 
normally given to the proprietary interests of the [creditor] . . . . The 
underlying principle here is that an administration for the benefit of un-
secured creditors should not be conducted at the expense of those who 
 
also discussed, but not answered, in Re Olympia & York Canary Wharf Ltd., [1993] 
B.C.L.C. 453, 454 (Ch.), and Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd. v. Sibec Devel-
opments Ltd., [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1253, 1259 (Ch.). Professor Goode suggests that “steps to 
enforce” denotes acts which in some degree interfere with the company’s enjoyment of 
its property or inhibit the administrator’s use of such property. Preparatory steps which 
do not have this effect are outside the mischief of the provision and are not prohibited. 
See GOODE, supra note 3, at 352–54. 
 60. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 248. 
 61. In re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc., [1992] Ch. 505, 542 (C.A.). 
 62. Id. 
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have proprietary rights which they are seeking to exercise, save to the 
extent that this may be unavoidable and even then this will usually be 
acceptable only to a strictly limited extent.63 
The In re Atlantic Computer Systems case dealt with the position of a 
chattel lessor and not a secured creditor. An application for leave to lift 
the stay by a secured creditor was considered in Re Meesan Investments 
Ltd.64 Here, a pre-administration secured creditor sought leave to enforce 
its security interest in respect of the debtor’s real property. The court 
held that the secured creditor must show particular prejudice and loss so 
as to differentiate itself from other pre-administration creditors, although 
it was not necessary to show that the administrator’s conduct was in 
some way improper or unreasonable.65 The case concerned a bank which 
held security over a property which the administrator was seeking to let. 
The bank was unable to persuade the court that it should be given leave 
to enforce its security despite the fact that the administrator had been 
seeking to find a tenant for many months and there was evidence that the 
secured debt, with accruing interest, was nearing the estimated sale value 
of the property. However, there were some unusual circumstances. The 
administrator had eventually decided to abandon the attempt to find a 
tenant and had decided to find a purchaser for the property instead. He 
had received an offer for the property before the court hearing in an 
amount which would ensure that the bank was fully repaid. The adminis-
trator was also able to show that it was likely that contract for a sale 
would be exchanged within a month. The court, therefore, was able to 
conclude that the bank would be fully repaid within a reasonable period 
of time. The court was sufficiently concerned about the position of the 
bank to insist that the administrator “return to court in two months’ time 
if he had not achieved a binding contract of sale and, in that event, to 
give notice to the bank so that it could make such application or submis-
sion it thought appropriate.”66 
2. The Automatic Stay Under U.S. Law 
When a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy petition is filed, the auto-
matic stay provided by section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code comes 
into force. The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code considered that: 
the automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections pro-
vided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. 
 64. Re Meesan Investments Ltd., [1988] 4 B.C.C. 788 (Ch.). 
 65. Id. at 791. 
 66. Id. at 790. 
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his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all fore-
closure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reor-
ganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that 
drove him into bankruptcy.67 
Section 362(a) identifies a number of acts to which the automatic stay 
applies. They include: 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or 
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced 
before the commencement of the [bankruptcy case], or to recover a 
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the 
[bankruptcy case] . . . ; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, 
of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the [bankruptcy 
case]; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
. . . 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the [bankruptcy case]; 
. . . 
(8) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the [bankruptcy case] against any claim against the 
debtor.68 
The ambit of the stay is broader than its English counterpart in a num-
ber of important respects. Section 362, like the English Insolvency Act of 
1986, prohibits any act by a secured creditor to enforce its security inter-
est or to obtain possession of property of the estate. For these purposes, 
“property of the estate” includes executory contracts and leases, so that 
the debtor’s interest in such contracts and leases is protected against ter-
mination or other interference that would have the effect of removing or 
hindering the debtor’s rights in violation of section 362 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.69 The prohibition also extends to any attempt to “exercise 
                                                                                                             
 67. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977).  
 68. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2007). 
 69. See id. §§ 362, 363(l), 365(e), 541(a). Note also that most bankruptcy termination 
clauses may not be enforced after the commencement of a chapter 11 case. These clauses 
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control over property of the estate.”70 This has been given a broad mean-
ing to include, for example, attempts by a landlord to terminate a master 
lease which under state law would have resulted in termination of the 
interest of the debtor as a sub-lessee.71 Section 362 also prevents the sole 
shareholder of a Chapter 11 debtor from filing a tax return claiming a 
worthless stock deduction which, if done, would have eliminated the 
debtor’s net operating loss.72 In addition, it prevents lenders to a holding 
company that have been granted a pledge on the stock of a subsidiary 
from—following default—voting the stock in the subsidiary after the 
subsidiary has filed a Chapter 11 case.73 
Section 362(a)(4) covers both judicial and non-judicial actions against 
property of the estate. A wide variety of actions are stayed automatically, 
including judicial and private foreclosure and self-help remedies against 
collateral, such as repossession or notification of account debtors. Each 
act in the foreclosure process is stayed. Similarly, even if property has 
been repossessed pursuant to a security interest, the sale of that property 
is stayed. 
The stay covers any “act to collect, assess or recover a [pre-petition] 
claim against the debtor.”74 The term “act” is broadly construed, and this 
sub-section is intended to prevent creditor harassment of the debtor in 
attempting to collect pre-petition debts. The conduct prohibited ranges 
from that of an informal nature, such as a telephone contact, to more 
formal judicial and administrative proceedings. However, simple minis-
terial acts, such as the presentment of a note, are not included. Serving a 
notice of acceleration of indebtedness may be subject to the effect of the 
automatic stay, even where the purpose of serving a notice of accelera-
tion is to preserve rights and fix an interest rate rather than to collect in-
debtedness at the time of the notice.75 
 
are generally unenforceable under sections 363, 365, and 541 of the Bankruptcy Code 
and any attempted enforcement is stayed. 
 70. Id. § 362(a)(3). 
 71. See In re 48th Street Steakhouse, Inc., 835 F.2d 427, 431 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 72. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS Steamship Co., 928 F.2d 565, 
574 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 73. See Official Bondholders Comm. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 209 B.R. 832, 838 
(D. Del. 1997). In this case, the lenders obtained relief from the automatic stay in the 
holding company’s Chapter 11 case, permitting them to vote the shares which served as 
their collateral. 
 74. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). 
 75. See In re Texaco Inc., 73 B.R. 960, 967 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). Where the no-
tice of acceleration will not give the creditor an advantage over other unsecured creditors, 
filing of such notice may be permitted by the court. Note also that “although section 362 
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In addition to the self effectuating injunction of section 362, under sec-
tion 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, the court has the discretionary power 
to stay action by creditors not subject to the automatic stay. Unlike the 
section 362 stay, a section 105 stay is not automatic. Therefore, a credi-
tor whose action is not within the scope of the section 362 stay may con-
tinue to act, pending the court’s determination. The standard for relief 
under section 105 is vague, and as a consequence, provides the court 
with considerable latitude in determining when the automatic stay should 
be extended. Specifically, section 105(a) requires the court to find that 
the relief requested is “necessary or appropriate” to carry out the provi-
sions of the Code.76 Thus, under section 105, depending on the circum-
stances, a debtor may be able to extend the stay to creditor actions 
against third parties such as guarantors or co-debtors. 
Of the various exceptions to the automatic stay, one is of particular in-
terest to secured lenders. Section 362(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code ex-
cepts “any act to perfect, or to maintain or continue the perfection of, an 
interest [such as a security interest] in property” if “applicable law . . . 
permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against a per-
son entity [including the debtor in possession] that acquires rights in such 
property before the date of perfection,” or if the act occurs within thirty 
days after the transfer becomes effective between transferor and trans-
feree.77 Accordingly, if a creditor is granted a purchase money security 
interest in an item of collateral and the borrower files a bankruptcy peti-
tion the following day (and before the creditor has filed a U.C.C. financ-
ing statement with respect to the collateral), the creditor will be free to 
file the necessary financing statement without a violation of the auto-
matic stay because Revised U.C.C. section 9-317(e) permits a secured 
party to file with respect to a purchase money security interest within 
twenty days after the debtor receives delivery of the collateral and still 
has priority over any intervening lien creditor. Note also that section 
362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a secured creditor to obtain 
relief from the automatic stay where “the debtor does not have an equity 
in [the collateral]; and [the collateral] is not necessary to an effective re-
organization.”78 
The Bankruptcy Code permits parties to request that the court deter-
mine whether the interest of a secured lender in property (including a 
 
stays foreclosure, it need not be read to preclude acceleration.” In re LHD Realty Corp., 
726 F.2d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 76. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). 
 77. Id. §§ 362(b)(3), 546(b)(1), 547(e)(2)(A). 
 78. Id. § 362(d)(2). 
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security interest) is adequately protected79 when the trustee or debtor in 
possession is using, selling, leasing, or borrowing against the property, or 
when the secured lender is otherwise stayed from enforcing its interest. 
These sections do not authorize the court to impose adequate protection. 
Instead, the parties may agree on appropriate protection, the secured 
creditor may request particular protection, or the trustee or debtor in pos-
session may propose protection that it believes is adequate. Any such 
agreement is subject to court approval, and in the absence of agreement, 
the court must determine whether in fact the protection is adequate. 
“Adequate protection” is mandated by certain provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code when requested by an entity with an interest in property in 
which the estate also has an interest. An entity is entitled to adequate pro-
tection as a matter of right, not merely as a matter of discretion, when the 
entity is stayed from enforcing its interest when the estate proposes to 
use, sell, or lease property in which the entity has an interest, or when 
property on which the entity has a lien is to be used as collateral for a 
loan. Adequate protection is required to protect a secured creditor’s in-
terest in property. Yet protection for the entire bundle of rights of the 
secured creditor is not required. In effect, protection is required only for 
the value of a secured creditor’s interest in the property. If a secured 
creditor’s claim exceeds the value of its interest in property, only the in-
terest is entitled to protection. The remainder of the claim is unsecured 
and does not give rise to an interest in property that requires protection. 
The claim of an oversecured creditor will generally increase over time 
as it accrues interest. Even if the value of the property is constant, any 
equity cushion will decrease as the amount of the claim increases. Never-
theless, adequate protection is not intended to protect the creditor’s right 
to continue to accrue interest. Put another way, the oversecured creditor’s 
allowed secured claim for post-petition interest is limited to the amount 
that a creditor was oversecured at the time of the filing. Consequently, 
the creditor is not entitled to a constant equity cushion. Instead, a de-
crease of the equity cushion as interest accrues should not adversely af-
fect the viability of the cushion, at least until the cushion becomes insuf-
ficient to continue to protect the petition date amount of the secured 
claim against declines in the value of the property. An oversecured credi-
tor is not entitled to receive periodic cash payments for accruing post-
petition interest as part of that creditor’s adequate protection in order to 
preserve the value of its equity cushion or otherwise. It is the decline in 
the value of the collateral against which protection is provided, not the 
perpetuation of the ratio of collateral to debt. 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. § 361 (defining “adequate protection”). 
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Although a secured party is entitled to protection of the value of its in-
terest, it is not entitled to profit from the trustee’s services that might en-
hance the value of the interest. Section 506(c) permits the trustee to re-
cover from the property costs and expenses of preserving or disposing of 
the property concerned to the extent of any benefit to the secured credi-
tor. A secured creditor is not entitled to protection against such expenses 
any more than protection against the accrual of interest, the more so be-
cause section 506(c) permits the trustee to recover the expenses from the 
collateral even when the claim is undersecured. However, when the se-
cured creditor is diligently seeking relief from the automatic stay, or to 
prevent or condition the use of collateral by the debtor under section 
362(d) or 363(e), section 506(c) is narrowly applied to prevent the estate 
from profiting at the expense of a secured creditor who is seeking to re-
move its collateral from the control of the debtor, and the issue of costs 
of preservation or disposal should be determined in the early stages of 
the litigation, perhaps at a preliminary hearing. 
The most important message of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to 
the treatment of an entity with an interest in property of the estate, or in 
the possession of the estate, is that its remedies may be suspended, even 
abrogated. The right of recourse to collateral may be terminated as the 
collateral is consumed in the business, as long as the value of its secured 
position is adequately protected. However, courts are divided on the 
question of whether the value to be protected is the value of the interest 
as of the date of the request for protection, or as of the commencement of 
the case. 
Adequate protection may take many forms, only some of which are il-
lustrated in section 361. When the collateral consists of inventory and 
accounts, adequate protection may require the provision of necessary 
accounting information, as well as additional or replacement collateral to 
compensate the creditor for its inability to enforce its after acquired 
property clause and the loss of collateral that would result from the 
debtor’s use of the proceeds of the inventory or accounts. When the col-
lateral consists of rents from real estate, adequate protection, at least for 
an interim period, may consist of a requirement that some portion, or all 
of the rents, be applied in a certain manner, perhaps to pay taxes, other 
senior liens, or interest. Of course, in some instances in which the value 
of the collateral is not declining, nothing more than insurance, taxes, and 
appropriate reporting may be needed to protect the value of the secured 
position. 
The first suggested alternative of section 361 requires the debtor to 
make a cash payment, or periodic cash payments, to the affected secured 
lender to the extent that the stay of section 362, the use, sale, or lease 
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under section 363, or the grant of lien under section 364 results in a de-
crease in the value of such entity’s interest in the estate’s property. The 
payments are intended to protect the secured lender against a decrease in 
the value of the property, which would directly affect his interest in the 
property.80 
The second alternative suggested in section 361 provides an additional 
or replacement lien to the extent necessary to compensate for a decrease 
in value of the secured creditor’s interest in the debtor’s property. Again, 
this does not necessarily mean that the creditor’s “cushion” is to be pro-
tected, although a creditor may be entitled to some cushion as part of the 
value of its interest in property. Each case must be decided upon its par-
ticular facts.81 
The grant of additional or replacement liens may be particularly appro-
priate when the affected creditor holds a “floating lien” on after-acquired 
property, such as inventory or accounts. The lien on collateral acquired 
after commencement of the case is cut off by section 552(a). If the debtor 
proposes to use, sell, or lease the collateral in the continuing operation of 
the debtor’s business, the amount and value of the creditor’s collateral 
may decrease if it is not replaced by newly acquired inventory or ac-
counts. Although technically the creditor’s interest can continue in the 
proceeds, notwithstanding section 552(a), the proceeds are likely to be 
cash that will need to be spent in the continuing operation of the busi-
ness. This cash will be cash collateral, the use of which requires adequate 
protection. One likely form of protection is to continue the lien of the 
creditor on accounts or inventory acquired after commencement of the 
case, as long as it is clear from the facts that this will provide adequate 
protection, while at the same time not creating a windfall to the secured 
creditor. Often, new inventory will be acquired with the proceeds of in-
ventory or accounts. However, it may be difficult to trace the proceeds 
into the new inventory. Permitting attachment of a security interest to the 
after-acquired property may remove this problem. 
The last alternative for adequate protection is a catch-all, permitting 
such other relief “as will result in the realization by such entity of the 
indubitable equivalent of such entity’s interest in such property.”82 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. § 361(1). 
 81. Id. § 361(2). 
 82. Id. 
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C. The After-Acquired Property Clause 
1. The After-Acquired Property Clause in English Insolvency 
Proceedings 
Under English law, an agreement for security over after-acquired prop-
erty is treated as creating a present (not a contingent) security interest 
that cannot take effect until the property has been acquired. Once value 
has been given for the grant of the security interest, each asset coming in 
under the after-acquired property clause is deemed to have been given 
for new value. The agreement for security over after-acquired property 
constitutes a present security; it creates an inchoate security interest 
which waits for the asset to be acquired so that it can fasten onto the as-
set. However, upon acquisition of the asset, the security interest takes 
effect as from the date of the security agreement.83 
The commencement of a winding up proceeding does not prevent the 
after-acquired property clause from having effect. A new asset arising 
after the commencement of the debtor’s winding-up becomes instantly 
caught by the secured creditor’s security interest (provided that the con-
sideration for the security interest was already executed before the com-
mencement of the winding up—that is, the secured lender had already 
advanced funds to the debtor).84 
The after-acquired property clause is effective to catch property com-
ing into the company’s hands after the commencement of the winding up 
despite section 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which renders void any 
disposition of the company’s property made after the commencement of 
the winding up. Since the security interest relates back to the time of the 
security agreement there is no conflict with section 127.85 
There are some exceptions to, and criticisms of, this rule. Sums recov-
ered by a liquidator as a result of a successful preference claim have been 
held to be designated to benefit only unsecured creditors, thereby falling 
outside assets charged by a security agreement.86  
                                                                                                             
 83. See ROY GOODE, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY 69–71 (3d ed. 
2003). 
 84. In re Lind [1915] 2 Ch. 345 (C.A.); In re Reis [1904] 2 K.B. 769 (C.A.).  
 85. Note also that the exercise of a power of sale by a mortgagee or receiver after 
commencement of the winding up does not contravene the prohibition in section 127 
against post-commencement dispositions, since to the extent that the asset being sold is 
subject to the security interest it is not property of the debtor at all. See Sowman v. David 
Samuel Trust Ltd., [1978] 1 W.L.R. 22 (Ch.).  
 86. In re M.C. Bacon Ltd., [1991] Ch. 127, 137; See In re Yagerphone, Ltd., [1935] 
Ch. 392, 396.  
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It was . . . established long before 1986 that any sum recovered from a 
creditor who has been wrongly preferred enures for the benefit of the 
general body of creditors, not for the benefit of the company or the 
holder of a floating charge. It does not become part of the company’s 
assets but is received by the liquidator impressed with a trust in favor of 
those creditors amongst whom he has to distribute the assets of the 
company.87  
This approach is the result of a construction of the statutory right of ac-
tion to recover a preference and the purpose for which such a right of 
action was created. It was not intended to be exercised so as to enable a 
secured creditor to obtain the benefit of the proceedings brought by a 
liquidator. However, recoveries by a liquidator for “misfeasance” (breach 
of duty) against directors and others will usually fall within the property 
charged. This is because the section which creates the right for a liquida-
tor to bring a misfeasance action, unlike the sections dealing with prefer-
ences (and the sections dealing with transactions at an undervalue and 
claims against directors resulting from wrongful trading), does not create 
a separate right or remedy available to a liquidator, but merely a special 
procedure for recovery by the company of its claims arising from a 
breach of duty.88 Thus, whereas the cause of action, which is the subject 
of a misfeasance summons, may exist prior to the winding up of the 
company, and thus are subject to the floating charge and after-acquired 
property clause, rights of action for wrongful trading, preferences, and 
transactions at an undervalue exist solely by virtue of the winding up of 
the company and cannot exist before such winding up. 
Administrators are also given the power to bring proceedings to re-
cover property invoking the statutory avoidable preference and transac-
tion at an undervalue provisions. The same approach as that applied in a 
winding-up to recoveries for preference and transactions at an under-
value should apply in administrations.89 
There has been some debate as to whether the rule is justified or 
whether it runs counter to the policy of insolvency law.90 Professor 
Goode has concluded that insofar as English law allows the chargee to 
increase his security margin during the preference period (generally six 
months prior to the commencement of the liquidation), the criticism is 
                                                                                                             
 87. See In re M.C. Bacon Ltd. [1991] Ch. at 137. 
 88. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 212. 
 89. See GAVIN LIGHTMAN & GABRIEL MOSS, THE LAW OF RECEIVERS AND 
ADMINISTRATORS OF COMPANIES 241–43 (3d ed. 2000). 
 90. See GOODE, supra note 83, at 69–71; see also Paul Matthews, The Effect of Bank-
ruptcy upon Mortgages of Future Property, 1 LLOYD’S MAR. & COMM. L.Q. 40 (1981) 
(U.K.). 
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well taken.91 However, enhancement of the security margin of the se-
cured creditor outside this period seems to be unobjectionable. The se-
cured creditor is entitled to assert security rights over future property 
without putting in fresh value because he is not taking out of the estate 
more than he put into it; within the debtor’s acceptance of the after-
acquired property clause, the money would never have been advanced in 
the first place. 
Professor Goode’s position, of course, reflects the position that exists 
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Section 547(c)(5) deals with the pref-
erence period, where the debtor receives after-acquired inventory (stock 
in trade or accounts receivable debt) subject to the security agreement. 
This provision requires the bankruptcy court to examine the collat-
eral/debt amounts at two points: (1) at the start of the preference period, 
and (2) at the moment of the filing of the Chapter 11 petition. The provi-
sion condemns a security interest as preferential to the extent that the 
lender has improved its position between those two dates. 
The impact of an administration proceeding on the rights of a secured 
creditor to property acquired by the debtor during the administration pro-
ceeding is in large part regulated by the relevant provisions in the Insol-
vency Act of 1986. The administrator “may dispose of or take action re-
lating to property which is subject to a floating charge as if it were not 
subject to the charge.”92 Where property is disposed of in reliance on this 
power, “the holder of the floating charge shall have the same priority in 
respect of acquired property as he had in respect of the property disposed 
of.”93 “Acquired property” means “property of the company which di-
rectly or indirectly represents the property disposed of.”94 In other words, 
the priority previously enjoyed in relation to the disposed of property 
carries through to its products or proceeds. These statutory provisions 
effectively validate in administrations the operation of the after-acquired 
property clause. 
It should also be noted, however, that the administrator may, with the 
permission of the court, dispose of property subject to a security other 
than a floating charge as if it was not subject to the security. The court’s 
power to grant permission is exercisable only on the application of the 
administrator and only where it is satisfied that the “disposal of the prop-
erty would be likely to promote the purpose of the administration in re-
spect of the company.”95 It is a required condition of any order giving 
                                                                                                             
 91. See GOODE, supra note 83, at 71. 
 92. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 70(1). 
 93. Id., c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 70(2). 
 94. Id., c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 70(3). 
 95. Id., c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 71. 
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leave to dispose of the property that the net proceeds of sale plus the 
amount by which those proceeds fall short of the value of the property 
determined by the court as the net amount which would be realized by 
sale on the open market by a willing vendor are to be applied in discharg-
ing the sums secured by the displaced security. 
2. The After-Acquired Property Clause in U.S. Bankruptcy Proceedings 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a security agreement may val-
idly create a security interest in collateral acquired after its execution.96 
However, section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code limits the effect of such 
after-acquired property clauses in a subsequent bankruptcy case. Gener-
ally, a pre-petition security interest does not attach to property acquired 
after the commencement of the bankruptcy case.97 
However, if the security agreement provides that the security interest 
extends to “proceeds, product, offspring, or profit” of the collateral, the 
security interest of the lender in such collateral is valid in the bankruptcy 
case unless the court, after notice and a hearing, limits this post-petition 
effect of the security interest “based on the equities of the case.”98 The 
legislative history relating to this provision indicates that the exception to 
the post-petition effect of the security interest is intended to cover a 
situation where assets of the estate, not subject to the security interest, 
are utilized in the completion and sale of collateral at an expense to the 
debtor’s estate and thereby depleted the funds available for the general 
unsecured creditors to the benefit of the secured creditor. 
Thus, it has been held that a lender’s security interest in pre-petition 
crops extends to post-petition crops produced with the proceeds of pre-
petition crops,99 and a secured creditor’s perfected security interest in 
rents and profits on real property extend to post-petition rents and prof-
its.100 However, a bank’s pre-petition security interest was held not to 
attach to crops planted after the petition was filed.101 In addition, a credi-
tor’s lien in hotel revenues, which were characterized as “accounts” un-
der Article 9 of the U.C.C. rather than “rents” under section 552 of the 
                                                                                                             
 96. U.C.C. § 9-204 (2000). 
 97. See, e.g., Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P. v. County of Orange (In re County of Or-
ange) 179 B.R. 185 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (pre-petition security interest of lenders, on 
certain tax and other future revenues of a Chapter 9 county debtor, to secure repayment of 
general revenue bonds terminates under section 552(a); noteholders thus had no lien 
against debtor’s post-petition revenues). 
 98. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). 
 99. E.g., In re Thacker, 291 B.R. 831 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2003). 
 100. E.g., In re SLC Ltd. V, 152 B.R. 755 (Bankr. D. Utah 1993). 
 101. E.g., Matter of Hunerdosse, 85 B.R. 999 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988). 
2007] SECURITY INTERESTS 959 
Bankruptcy Code,102 did not extend to post-petition revenues.103 More-
over, a creditor’s lien on “rents, income and profits” from a debtor’s 
farmland did not extend to new crops which the debtor plants post-
petition by utilizing post-petition income and funds from another 
party.104 
In order to avoid to the greatest extent possible the limitations con-
tained in section 552, security agreements will usually provide for a se-
curity interest in proceeds, rents, issues, and profits. If all of the materials 
consumed in the manufacturing process (and perhaps the funds used to 
pay the labor component) are subject to the lender’s security interest, the 
bankruptcy court should have no basis to invoke its equitable power to 
limit the security interest. In addition, the security documentation may 
contain provisions to facilitate the creditor’s tracing of proceeds of col-
lateral. 
D. The Debtor’s Power to Use Collateral and Sell the Collateral Free 
and Clear of the Security Interest 
1. Debtor’s Right to Use Secured Assets in Administration Proceedings 
An administrator is deemed to act as agent of the debtor in exercising 
his powers.105  These powers, which are wide-ranging, are to be exer-
cised to enable the administrator to achieve the statutory purpose of the 
administration procedure. Since the Enterprise Act of 2002, there is one 
statutory purpose within which there is a threefold hierarchy. Paragraph 
3(1) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act of 1986 states: 
Purpose of administration 
                                                                                                             
 102. Section 552(2) of the Bankruptcy Code states that where the pre-petition security 
interest extends to: 
property of the debtor acquired before the commencement of the case and to 
amounts paid as rents of such property or the fees, charges, accounts, or other 
payments for the use or occupancy of rooms and other public facilities in ho-
tels, motels, or other lodging properties, then such security interest extends to 
such rents and such fees, charges, accounts, or other payments acquired by the 
estate after the commencement of the case to the extent provided in such secu-
rity agreement except to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and 
based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise. 
11 U.S.C. § 552(2) (2000).  
 103. In re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. 543 (9th Cir. Bankr. App. 1991). 
 104. E.g., In re Olsen, 87 B.R. 148 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988). 
 105. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 69. 
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3(1) The administrator of a company must perform his functions with 
the objective of— 
(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or 
(b) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a 
whole than would be likely if the company were wound 
up (without first being in administration), or 
(c) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or 
more secured or preferential creditors. 
(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (4), the administrator of a company must 
perform his functions in the interests of the company’s creditors as a 
whole. 
(3) The administrator must perform his functions with the objective 
specified in sub-paragraph (1)(a) unless he thinks either— 
(a) that is it not reasonably practicable to achieve that objec-
tive, or 
(b) that the objective specified in sub-paragraph (1)(b) would 
achieve a better result for the company’s creditors as a 
whole. 
(4) The administrator may perform his functions with the objective 
specified in sub-paragraph (1)(c) only if— 
(a) he thinks that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve 
either of the objectives specified in sub-paragraph (1)(a) 
and (b), and 
(b)  he does not unnecessarily harm the interest of the credi-
tors of the company as a whole.106 
To enable the administrator to achieve the statutory purpose, he has 
broad management powers in relation to the debtor’s property, including 
the power to “do anything necessary or expedient for the management of 
the affairs, business and property of the [debtor].”107 Furthermore, as 
noted, the administrator is given certain powers to deal with charged 
property. In many cases, in order to achieve the statutory purpose of ad-
ministration, the administer will need to be able to use or dispose of all 
the debtor’s property, including that part of it which is charged to a se-
cured lender. 
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 107. Id., c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 59(1). The administrator’s powers are set out in a 
long list in Schedule 1 to the Insolvency Act. 
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In the case of assets subject to any security which when created was a 
floating charge, the administrator is given the power to dispose of such 
assets, or otherwise take action relating to such property, as if the assets 
were not subject to the floating charge. Accordingly, the administrator 
can deal with such assets and dispose of them as he sees fits without ref-
erence to the floating chargeholder, and, presumably, without being fet-
tered by any contractual restrictions contained within the floating charge, 
such as a negative pledge clause.108 This power to use assets enables the 
administrator to trade the debtor’s business notwithstanding the existence 
of the floating charge security. As noted above, where the security inter-
est over debts and receivables is a floating charge, the administrator will 
have the ability to fund the administration by using proceeds resulting 
from repayments of debts and receivables without needing to obtain the 
consent of the secured lender. The secured lender is protected because he 
is granted the same priority as he had in relation to the floating charge 
assets in respect of any of property directly or indirectly representing the 
disposed of assets. Accordingly, if the administrator, for example, sells 
plant machinery subject to the floating charge, the proceeds of the sale 
will fall within the floating charge and the holder of the charge will be 
entitled to the same priority as against third parties (e.g., holders of sub-
sequent floating charges) in respect of the proceeds as he had over the 
disposed of plant machinery.109 
If the administrator wishes to dispose of collateral subject to a fixed 
charge, he must apply to the court for an order authorizing him to do so. 
The court may make such an order only where the court thinks that dis-
posal of the property would be likely to promote the purpose of admini-
stration. The court must make it a condition of any such order that the net 
proceeds of disposal together with any further sums required to be added 
to the net proceeds so as to produce the amount determined by the court 
as the net amount which would be realized on the sale of the property at 
market value be applied towards discharging the sums secured by the 
fixed charge. Accordingly, the administrator is able to dispose of fixed 
charge assets where, for example, he wishes to sell the whole of the 
debtor’s business and assets (where such a sale promotes the statutory 
purpose), even if the fixed charge holder does not give his consent. 
                                                                                                             
 108. If the floating charge assets are to be regarded in the administrator’s hands as not 
being subject to the charge, then it follows that the contractual provisions in the floating 
charge relating to dealings with such assets will not operate so as to bind the administra-
tor. Otherwise the contractual stipulations would be promoted to a status superior to the 
proprietary rights granted by the security. 
 109. Note that the administrator is obliged to set aside a prescribed part of the debtor’s 
net property for unsecured creditors out of floating charge assets coming into his hands. 
962 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:3 
2. Debtor’s Right to Use Secured Assets in Chapter 11 Proceedings 
The existence of a lender’s security interest in property of the debtor—
either because it is pre-petition property subject to a pre-petition security 
interest or because it is post-petition proceeds of pre-petition collateral in 
which a security interest has attached pursuant to section 552(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code—does not prevent the debtor from using, selling, or 
leasing the collateral (and perhaps drastically reducing its value) if the 
debtor complies with the provisions governing such use, sale, or lease set 
forth in section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
While section 363 contains important protections for secured lenders, a 
lender can almost never rely on the statutory provisions to provide com-
plete protection. The vigorous involvement of the secured lender in as-
serting its rights under section 363 is considered absolutely essential to 
prevent a diminution in its collateral position. A passive lender may find 
(perhaps too late) that the debtor has persuaded the court to “rubber 
stamp” its proposed uses of the lender’s collateral, which imperils its 
value. Furthermore, not all the protective provisions are automatic. Thus, 
a lender’s security interest in collateral will receive protection from the 
court only if the lender so requests. 
Under section 363(a), “cash collateral” includes cash and cash equiva-
lents (such as deposit accounts, negotiable instruments and documents of 
title) in which a secured party has an interest. Cash collateral also in-
cludes proceeds of pre-petition collateral, such as post-petition collec-
tions of pre-petition accounts, to the extent the security interest in such 
proceeds is recognized as valid under the Bankruptcy Code. 
Unless the secured party with an interest in cash collateral consents to 
its use by the debtor, cash collateral may not be used unless the court 
authorizes such use after notice to interested parties and the opportunity 
for a hearing. At any such hearing, or at any time thereafter, the secured 
party having an interest in cash collateral may request the court to “pro-
hibit or condition such use,” to the extent necessary to provide adequate 
protection of the secured party’s interest in such cash collateral. The se-
cured party will have the burden of proving its interest in cash collateral. 
However, the debtor must show that the creditor’s interest is adequately 
protected before the court will authorize the debtor’s use of a lender’s 
cash collateral.110 
                                                                                                             
 110. An example is helpful in understanding the application of section 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Assume that a lender provided working capital financing to the debtor 
prior to the filing of the Chapter 11 petition by making advances based on “eligible” ac-
counts and inventory. Assume further that the lender either does not desire to continue 
financing the debtor on a post-petition basis, or, if such financing is contemplated, it is 
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Typically, court authorization to use cash collateral will be sought im-
mediately upon filing of the Chapter 11 petition or very shortly thereaf-
ter. Because a pre-petition secured lender has the right to adequate pro-
tection in order to safeguard its interests, the lender has significant bar-
gaining leverage in arriving at a consensual arrangement for the debtor to 
use cash collateral. 
The most common form of adequate protection provided to a pre-
petition lender for the use of its cash collateral is a replacement lien on 
other assets of the debtor. For example, a creditor may be offered as ade-
quate protection a lien on accounts that the debtor intends to create with 
the use of the cash collateral or a lien on some of the debtor’s fixed as-
sets. 
Because the use of cash collateral by a debtor does not involve the ad-
vance of new funds to the debtor, but rather involves the use by the 
debtor of funds that are subject to the lender’s security interest, the grant 
of a replacement lien is not intended to provide a lender with additional 
security over and above what it holds at the time the use of cash collat-
eral is authorized. Rather, the purpose of a replacement lien on assets of 
the debtor is to provide protection to the lender in the event that the 
lender’s collateral position is adversely affected by the debtor‘s use of its 
cash collateral. Thus, for example, a lender may be granted a replace-
ment lien on post-petition inventory acquired by the debtor, and the 
lender will be able to look to that inventory as security in the event of a 
dissipation of its cash collateral. 
The trustee or debtor in possession has the right to use, sell, or lease 
non-cash collateral (such as inventory, machinery, and equipment) in the 
ordinary course of its business without obtaining court approval. As a 
result, a lender will be required to initiate a request for specific adequate 
protection for such use, and it is recommended that such protection be 
requested as early as possible during the case as permitted by section 
363(e) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(b). 
 
uncertain whether cross-collateralization provisions can be obtained in a financing order. 
Subsequent to the filing of the Chapter 11 petition, the debtor receives collections on the 
pre-petition accounts that would ordinarily be remitted to the pre-petition lender to pay 
down the loan. Upon the filing of the Chapter 11 petition, such collections constitute cash 
collateral and the debtor may use such cash collateral subject to the limitations of section 
363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Under these circumstances, the pre-petition lender will be 
concerned as to whether the debtor will be permitted to use the lender’s cash collateral 
and for what purposes. If adequate safeguards on the use of a pre-petition lender’s cash 
collateral are not imposed, the lender could see an important element of its collateral 
dissipated in the daily operations of an unprofitable debtor. See ROBERT J. ROSENBERG ET 
AL., COLLIER LENDING INSTITUTIONS AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE § 4.05 (1986). 
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As with the use of cash collateral, adequate protection should include 
replacement liens and additional liens on property of the debtor. How-
ever, because non-cash collateral is subject to depreciation during the 
course of the case (whereas cash collateral has a fixed value), the lender 
may be successful in a request to obtain periodic cash payments equal to 
the amount of the depreciation if he can demonstrate that his collateral is 
so depreciating. Such payments are expressly authorized as a form of 
adequate protection. 
Under section 363(b)(1), the use, sale, or lease of the debtor’s property 
outside the ordinary course of business requires court approval after no-
tice and a hearing to interested parties. For example, if the debtor pro-
posed to sell one of its several manufacturing plants, it would require 
court approval under section 363(b)(1). For court approval, the sale must 
be in the best interests of the estate, requiring findings of a fair and rea-
sonable price and good faith. Sales of certain personally identifiable in-
formation are subject to further limitation. 
If the debtor would like to sell property in which another party has a 
security interest, it must also comply with section 363(f). Generally, the 
requirements of section 363(f) are met either by obtaining the consent of 
the party holding the lien, or by having the lien or security interest attach 
to the proceeds of the sale. Obviously, such sales can be either very fa-
vorable or adverse to the lender. If, for example, the property is sold at 
an amount in excess of the debt to the lender, the lender will, in effect, 
have had the bankruptcy court conduct a foreclosure sale for its benefit 
(without the attendant potential liability arising from a lender’s non-
bankruptcy conduct of a foreclosure sale), and obtain repayment. How-
ever, in other situations, the debtor may propose to sell the property at a 
price which the lender believes is less than the actual value of the prop-
erty. A lender, under such circumstances, could object to the proposed 
sale as not being in the best interest of the estate. In the alternative, a 
lender could, unless the court orders otherwise, “bid in” its secured claim 
(i.e., apply the amount of its claim as an offset against the purchase 
price), purchase the property and resell the property at a higher value. 
E. Post-Petition Financing, Expenses, and Surcharges 
1. The Administration Expenses Doctrine and Secured Creditors Under 
English Law 
The provisions governing the payment by the administrator of ex-
penses incurred by him during the administration and for payment of his 
remuneration are contained in paragraph 99 of Schedule B1 of the Insol-
vency Act 1986 (and rule 2.67 of the Insolvency Rules 1986), which fo-
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cuses on the position when the administrator vacates office. These provi-
sions impose a statutory charge over the debtor’s property in the custody 
or control of the administrator at the time of his vacation of office, and 
are of no effect before then. Although, strictly, sums payable under the 
statutory charge only become payable when the administrator vacates 
office, it is well understood that administrators will, in the ordinary way, 
pay expenses of the administration as they arise during the continuation 
of the administration. What is picked up at the end of the administration 
by the statutory charge are those sums payable under the statutory charge 
which have not at that point been paid. 
In recovering his expenses and remuneration, the administrator is only 
entitled to resort to assets that are the property of the company. His rights 
are subordinate to those of a holder of a fixed charge, but take priority 
over claims secured by a floating charge. 
The ranking of the administrator’s entitlement to expenses and remu-
neration from floating charge assets is as follows: 
(1) sums payable in respect of debt or liability arising under a contract 
made by the administrator, or a contract of employment adopted by the 
administration, before cessation of his appointment; 
(2) the administrator’s remuneration and expenses (which between 
themselves are to rank in the order set out in the Insolvency Rules);111 
(3) the prescribed part which the administrator is required to set aside 
for ordinary unsecured creditors from assets subject to a floating charge 
if created on or after 15 September 2003 and remaining after preferen-
tial debts have been paid.112 
The term “expenses” was not defined in the Insolvency Act 1986. How-
ever, the Insolvency Rules were amended in 2003 by adding Rule 2.67, 
which lists nine categories of expenses, including “necessary disburse-
ments by the administrator,”113 and provides that they are payable in the 
order listed in Rule 2.67(1). The reference to expenses in paragraph 99 is 
to mean and comprise the items listed in Rule 2.67(1). 
Prior to the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002, there was consider-
able uncertainty as to which liabilities could be treated as expenses. For 
example, there was an issue as to whether the statutory language allowed 
claims arising under pre-administration contracts to be paid as expenses 
                                                                                                             
 111. Rule 2.67(1) of the Insolvency Rules, 1986, S.I. 1986/1925, contains a list of nine 
items, the first of which is “expenses properly incurred by the administrator in perform-
ing his functions in the administration of the company.” 
 112. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 99. 
 113. Insolvency Rules, 1986, Rule 2.67(1)(f). 
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in circumstances where the benefit of a contract had been used by the 
administrator to assist the administration (e.g., rent payable under pre-
administration real estate leases where the leased property had been oc-
cupied during the to the estate’s benefit). Under the old law, the statutory 
reference was to “expenses incurred by the administrator,” which limited 
expenses to claims for which the administrator was personally liable. The 
law thereby excluded liabilities arising under pre-administration con-
tracts, and only liabilities under contracts “entered into” by the adminis-
trator were covered by the other provisions relating to the administrator’s 
statutory charge. However, the courts had held that, separately from and 
in addition to the statutory charge provisions in the Insolvency Act of 
1986, the court has the power, at its discretion, to direct an administrator 
to discharge liabilities out of assets in his hands even if they are not tech-
nically “expenses.”114 The court’s jurisdiction was held to arise because 
the administrator is an officer of the court, and by virtue of the admini-
stration moratorium on the enforcement by creditors of their rights. 
It has been held recently that the changes made by the Enterprise Act 
2002 have significantly amended the law. In Re Trident Fashions,115 the 
court held that business rates on property occupied by the company dur-
ing the administration were to be treated as an expense (a “necessary dis-
bursement”) because Rule 2.67 had changed the law so that the position 
in administrations is now the same as that in liquidations. Liabilities in-
curred by the company after the commencement of the administration 
must be paid as necessary disbursements; the liability to pay business 
rates arose by reference to the company’s period of occupation. 
The liquidation language had been held116 to exclude any exercise of dis-
cretion by the court in determining whether the liquidator should pay 
expenses falling within the liquidation rule.117 Where a liability falls 
within the applicable rule, it has to be paid, and the court has no discre-
tion to exercise. This decision does not address the treatment of liabilities 
under pre-administration contracts. 
It remains to be seen whether this approach will be followed when the 
issue is tested at the appellate level. At the time of writing, the decision is 
                                                                                                             
 114. In re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc. [1992] Ch. 505, 520–30 (C.A.). 
 115. Re Trident Fashions, [2007] E.W.H.C. 400 (Ch.); see also Freakley v. Centre 
Reinsurance Int’l, [2006] U.K.H.L. 45. The decision of the House of Lords in Freakley 
related to the law prior to the changes made by the Enterprise Act 2002. Administration 
expenses used (in section 19(4) of the Insolvency Act) to have to be “expenses properly 
incurred by the administrator,” but now the reference in the Act is to the “[administra-
tor’s] expenses.” Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 99(3). 
 116. See In re Toshoku Finance U.K. Plc. [2002] 1 W.L.R. 671 (H.L.) 
 117. See Insolvency Rules, 1986, Rule 4.218. 
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controversial, not least because a principled basis for analyzing the na-
ture of expenses in an administration remains to be established.  
It should be noted that where the administrator needs to borrow funds 
for the purpose of the administration, these provisions allow him to do 
so, and to create new, post-administration security interests, with priority 
over pre-administration floating charge assets. However, there is no abil-
ity to prime and subordinate assets subject to a pre-administration fixed 
charge. 
2. Post-Petition Financing in Chapter 11 Cases and the Impact on Pre-
Petition Secured Creditors 
The Bankruptcy Code contains various provisions designed to assist a 
debtor in obtaining post-petition financing in connection with the 
debtor’s Chapter 11 proceedings. The Code authorizes various different 
types of financing that may be permitted starting with unsecured borrow-
ing and concluding with the creation of new first priority liens ranking 
ahead of existing pre-petition security interests. 
Section 364(a) permits a debtor to obtain unsecured credit or incur 
post-petition unsecured indebtedness in the “ordinary course of busi-
ness.” No court approval is required for such transactions provided that 
the ordinary course of business standard is satisfied. Post-petition indebt-
edness, incurred by a debtor in the ordinary course of business, and inter-
est payable on such indebtedness, is entitled to an administrative expense 
priority that is pari passu with all other administrative expenses, and is 
senior to all other priorities (e.g., wage claims and tax claims) in the 
Bankruptcy Code priority ranking scheme, with the exception of “super-
priorities” (which are senior to administrative expense priorities). 
Under section 364(b), the bankruptcy court, after proper “notice and a 
hearing,” may approve an unsecured post-petition loan or extension of 
credit that is not in the ordinary course of business. Any such loan or ex-
tension of credit will have the same administrative expense priority as 
any extension of credit under section 364(a). 
Most potential post-petition lenders are understandably reluctant to ad-
vance funds to the debtor and receive solely an administrative expense 
claim. Despite the impressive-sounding first priority status accorded the 
administrative expense claim granted to a post-petition lender pursuant to 
a court-authorized section 364(b) lending arrangement, in a liquidation, 
the lender’s administrative expense claim will be pari passu, rather than 
senior to, all other administrative expenses. Other administrative expense 
claims would include claims of all parties who have provided goods or 
services to the debtor during the Chapter 11 period (including, but not 
limited to, supplier’s claims, fees of attorneys, accountants and special 
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consultants, and the fees of any professionals retained by the official 
creditors’ committee and equity security holders’ committee). In addi-
tion, if a Chapter 11 case is subsequently converted to a liquidation case 
under Chapter 7, Chapter 7 administrative expense claims will be senior 
to the Chapter 11 administrative expense claims. Upon liquidation, after 
payments to all secured creditors, all entities holding claims entitled to 
superpriority, and all holders of Chapter 7 administrative claims, little 
may be left for post-petition lenders who hold claims with Chapter 11 
administrative expense status. 
For these reasons, a post-petition lender will usually require additional 
protection before agreeing to provide a debtor with post-petition financ-
ing. Section 364(c)(1) permits a post-petition lender to obtain such addi-
tional protection by obtaining “superpriority” over all administrative ex-
penses.118 To obtain a superpriority claim, court approval is required, and 
a showing must be made that the debtor is unable to obtain unsecured 
credit allowable as an ordinary administrative expense. To support the 
request for a superpriority, a lender will need to testify in court that it 
will not advance funds to the debtor unless it receives a superpriority 
claim. 
Section 364(c) also provides a method for a post-petition lender to re-
ceive, either in addition to, or exclusive of, a superpriority claim, security 
interests in assets of the debtor. However, as with any post-petition fi-
nancing under section 364(c), in which the lender is granted a superpri-
ority, if the lender is granted liens and security interests in assets of the 
debtor, the financing arrangement must be approved by the bankruptcy 
court after notice and a hearing. In addition, the fininancing arrangement 
requires a showing that unsecured credit allowable as an administrative 
expense cannot otherwise be obtained by the debtor. If the foregoing re-
quirements are met, the post-petition financing may be secured (pursuant 
to section 364(c)) by a lien on unencumbered property of the debtor, or 
by a junior lien on property of the debtor, that is already subject to a lien. 
Section 364(d) is a less common method of providing secured post-
petition financing to a debtor than section 364(c), because section 364(d) 
financings generally adversely affect the security position of a pre-
petition secured lender. Section 364(d) permits the debtor to obtain credit 
secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the debtor that is already 
subject to a lien. As a result, in the absence of consent by the existing 
                                                                                                             
 118. Note that some courts insist on a “carve out” from superpriority status and post-
petition liens in a reasonable amount designed to provide for the payment of the fees of 
the debtor’s and creditors’ committee’s counsel and possible trustee’s counsel in order to 
preserve the adversary system. E.g., In re Ocean Power Corp., 2007 WL 949598 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
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lienholder, attempted financings under section 364 are likely to be vigor-
ously opposed by the lender whose lien is to be “primed.” To obtain fi-
nancing under section 364(d), the debtor must demonstrate to the court 
that it cannot otherwise obtain financing, and that the “primed” lender 
either consents or will be provided “adequate protection” of its interest in 
its collateral. Thus, section 364(d) permits the bankruptcy court to 
“prime” the lien of one lender in favor of another lender if the court de-
termines that the interest of the lender being primed is afforded “ade-
quate protection.” Courts have held that a primed lender has been af-
forded adequate protection if: (1) the debtor demonstrates that sufficient 
equity will remain in the collateral after the senior or additional lien is 
granted to cover the indebtedness of the primed lender; or (2) the pro-
ceeds from the loan to be secured by the senior or additional lien will 
result in an increase in the value of the collateral.119 However, courts and 
commentators have criticized the granting of priming liens on collateral 
where the existing creditor is undersecured. In cases permitting an under-
secured creditor’s lien to be primed, some courts have found that ade-
quate protection is afforded based on the likelihood that the collateral 
value will be enhanced.120 A debtor seeking approval of a priming lien, 
but not offering additional collateral to the existing secured creditor, 
would need to put forward strong evidence (including credible financial 
projections) to establish that the proposed priming financing will en-
hance collateral value. 
A court must value the collateral in order to determine whether suffi-
cient equity is in a lender’s collateral to justify granting an additional or 
senior lien on such collateral, or whether the proceeds from the loan to be 
secured by the senior or additional lien would result in an increase in the 
value of the collateral. To value the collateral properly, the court must 
determine which valuation standard should be used. Some courts have 
used a going concern (rather than a liquidation) analysis to value existing 
facilities after determining that the debtor is not likely to be liquidated.121 
Courts have also found that a primed lender can be afforded adequate 
protection if the lender is granted replacement liens on the debtor’s other 
assets.122 
                                                                                                             
 119. See, e.g., In re Chicago, Missouri and Western Ry. Co., 90 B.R. 344 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1988).  
 120. E.g., In re Sky Valley, 100 B.R. 107 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). 
 121. E.g., In re Beker Industries Corp., 58 B.R. 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 122. E.g., In re TNT Farms, 226 B.R. 436 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998).  
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3. The Expenses Doctrine in Chapter 11 and Its Impact on Secured 
Creditors 
The Bankruptcy Code establishes different levels of priority for ex-
penses—priority and superpriority. Section 507 is entitled “priorities,” 
but it does not encompass the full range of the Code’s priority rules. 
Other sections confer “super” priorities on a claimant. 
In a Chapter 7 liquidation, expenses generally rank after the claims of 
secured creditors. In a Chapter 11 case, the timing and ordering of pay-
ments depends on the terms of the plan of reorganization. The plan must 
comply with certain core rules. First, the plan can only be confirmed if 
priority claims are paid in full in cash on the effective date of the plan. In 
addition, a secured creditor’s collateral can, in certain circumstances, be 
surcharged with the costs and expenses of preserving the collateral 
thereby ensuring that the secured creditor does not recover the full value 
of his security. 
Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the “allowance” of 
administrative expenses. Section 503(a) authorizes a party to file a re-
quest for payment of an administrative expense. Section 503(b) provides 
that administrative expenses of the type described therein are to be al-
lowed by the court after notice and a hearing. While there are various 
exceptions, administrative expenses are generally those that are incurred 
by the estate after the commencement of the Chapter 11 case. 
Section 503 derives its importance from section 507. Section 507 pro-
vides that certain categories of expenses and claims123 have priority in 
the distribution of the assets of the estate. Section 507 lists ten categories 
of priority claims. The second priority, set forth in subsection 507(a)(2), 
consists of administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b). The 
impact of section 507, and hence of section 503, is somewhat different in 
cases filed under different chapters of the Code. 
In a Chapter 7 case, property of the estate is distributed according to 
the distribution schedule of section 726. This section provides that prop-
erty is first distributed by payment of claims of a kind and in the order 
specified in section 507. But all of these claims rank after secured claims. 
Therefore, secured creditors are entitled to be paid full up to the value of 
the collateral securing their claim before unsecured claims are paid at all. 
                                                                                                             
 123. One of the most important concepts in the Bankruptcy Code is that of a “claim.” 
Claims are paid, if allowed, and claims are discharged. “Claim” is defined very broadly, 
and is intended to cover all legal obligations of the debtor no matter how remote or con-
tingent. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2007). Even a right to an equitable remedy can con-
stitute a claim, including rights giving rise to the remedy of an injunction or specific per-
formance if the debtor’s breach gives rise to a right to payment. 
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In a Chapter 11 case, payments are made according to the terms of a 
confirmed plan of reorganization (as opposed to a distribution by the 
trustee). A plan can only be confirmed if it provides for the full payment 
of section 507(a) priority claims in cash, unless the holder of the claim 
has agreed to a different treatment. As a result, some of these claims may 
fail to be paid before secured claims. 
Section 503(b) states that the administrative expenses “include” the 
nine listed categories. Section 102(3) further provides that the terms “in-
clude” and “including” are not to be construed as limitations. The result 
is that the nine described categories cannot be considered an exhaustive 
list of all of the types of claims that are entitled to administrative priority 
treatment. The court may determine that additional types of claims are 
expenses that should be accorded administrative priority in a particular 
case. A court is not free to determine that a claim qualifying as an admin-
istrative expense under the express language of section 503(b) should not 
share in administrative priority with other administrative expenses, or 
should be subordinate to payment of other administrative expenses. 
In general, all claims allowable under section 503(b) as administrative 
expenses share equally as first-priority claims. However, section 507(b) 
of the Code grants a “superpriority” to certain administrative expense 
claims of secured creditors, which come into being due to a shortfall aris-
ing between the adequate protection ordered by the court under sections 
362, 363, or 364, and the actual loss in value of the property in which the 
secured creditor has a lien. A claim enjoying this “superpriority” has pri-
ority over all other unsecured claims, including those entitled to adminis-
trative priority under section 507(a)(1). 
The order of priority of administrative claims can also be affected by 
an even greater “superpriority” arising under section 364(c) of the Code 
when necessary to enable the trustee to obtain unsecured credit. This 
claim is given priority even over the superpriority claim of section 
507(b). Section 364(c) provides that the court may authorize the estate to 
obtain credit with a priority over all other administrative expenses if the 
trustee is unable to obtain unsecured credit allowable under section 
503(b)(1) of this title as a mere administrative expense. 
The first of the specified types of claims allowable as administrative 
expenses are those described by section 503(b)(1)(A) as “the actual, nec-
essary costs and expenses of preserving the estate.”124 Section 
503(b)(1)(A) makes no attempt to enumerate potential items of expense 
that fit within the phrase other than to state that it does include “wages, 
salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the commencement 
                                                                                                             
 124. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
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of the case” and certain back pay awards pursuant to a judicial or Na-
tional Labor Relations Board proceeding. Based on the wording of sec-
tion 503(b)(1)(A), courts have developed several tests for determining 
whether a particular claim qualifies for being an actual and necessary 
cost of preserving the estate. Many courts have stated generally that for a 
debt to qualify as a necessary preservation expense, the debt must satisfy 
two requirements: (1) it must have arisen from a transaction with the es-
tate; and (2) it must have benefited the estate in some demonstrable 
way.125 
The general bankruptcy rule, as noted above, is that, absent an express 
agreement to the contrary, the expenses associated with administering a 
bankruptcy estate are not chargeable to a secured creditor’s collateral or 
claim. Instead, the expenses but must be borne out of the unencumbered 
assets of the estate. But an important exception to this general rule is set 
out in section 506(c), which permits a debtor to recover administrative 
expenses from a secured creditor’s collateral if three conditions are satis-
fied: (i) the expenses are “necessary” to preserve or dispose of the collat-
eral; (ii) the expenses are “reasonable”; and (iii) the incurrence of the 
expenses provides a “benefit” to the secured creditor. Similarly, expenses 
may be recoverable where the secured creditor expressly or impliedly 
consents to the incurrence of the expense, or caused the expense. In addi-
tion, as amended in 2005, section 506(c) expressly includes as part of the 
amounts that may be charged against the secured party’s collateral all ad 
valorem property taxes with respect to the collateral. 
In general, a secured creditor receives a “benefit” within the meaning 
of section 506(c) if the relevant expense preserved or increased the value 
of its collateral. The general concern underlying this requirement is the 
prevention of a windfall to the secured creditor. A secured creditor 
should not reap the benefit of actions taken to preserve the secured credi-
tor’s collateral without shouldering the cost. In addition, expenses are 
“necessary” to the extent that they relate to the preservation or disposi-
tion of the secured creditor’s collateral, and then only to the extent they 
are not attributable to any unwarranted delay by a party other than the 
secured creditor. Finally, expenses are “reasonable“ to the extent that 
they are incurred in the ordinary course at a reasonable price. 
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F. The Ability to Vary and Cram Down Security Interests Within the 
Bankruptcy Proceedings 
1. The Ability of Administration Proceedings to Vary and Cram Down 
Security Interests 
Unlike Chapter 11, the administration procedure does not incorporate a 
mechanism for varying or discharging creditors’ rights. The administra-
tor is required to prepare proposals to be placed before creditors and on 
which creditors are allowed to vote. However, these are merely proposals 
for achieving the purpose of administration—how he proposes to manage 
the business, affairs, and property of the debtor so as to rescue the com-
pany as a going concern, or, if that is not reasonably practicable or pro-
duces a result for the company’s creditors that as a whole is worse than 
an alternative course of action, pursue a course of action that will pro-
duce a better result for creditors than a winding up.  
In most cases, the administrator’s statement of proposals has to be ac-
companied by an invitation to creditors to attend the initial creditors’ 
meeting at which the proposals are considered. The date set for this 
meeting must be “as soon as is reasonably practicable after the debtor 
enters administration,” and “in any event, within a period of ten weeks 
beginning with the date on which the company enters administration.”126 
At the meeting of creditors, creditors may approve the administrator’s 
proposals with or without modification. But, where there are modifica-
tions, the administrator must give his consent. The “majority (in value) 
vote of those present and voting, in person or by proxy,” is required to 
pass a resolution to approve the administrator’s proposals.127 Any resolu-
tion, however, is invalid if those voting against it include more than half 
of the creditors to whom notice of the meeting was sent, and who are not, 
to the best of the belief of the chairman at the meeting, persons con-
nected with the company. 
At such a creditors’ meeting, however, a secured creditor is entitled to 
vote only in respect of the balance (if any) of his debts, after deducting 
the value of his security as estimated by him. Accordingly, a partly se-
cured creditor will only be entitled to vote on the administrator’s propos-
als to the extent of his shortfall. The unsecured creditors are the constitu-
ency who control approval of administration proposals. 
                                                                                                             
 126. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 51(2). Note that these time limits 
may be varied by the court on an application of the administrator, or by up to twenty-
eight days with the consent of creditors. See id., c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 51(4). 
 127. Insolvency Rules, 1986, Rule 2.43. 
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The reason for this is that an administrator’s statement of proposals 
may not include “any action which affects the right of a secured creditor 
of the company to enforce his security.”128 Thus while the secured credi-
tor is disenfranchised and prevented from voting on the administrator’s 
proposals to the extent that the value of his collateral exceeds his secured 
debt, he is protected because of the limits imposed on what can be in-
cluded in the administrator’s proposals. As a practical matter, therefore, 
the administrator must agree with the secured creditor on a course of ac-
tion at least in so far as the administrator needs to propose steps which 
would affect the right of the secured creditor to “enforce” his security. It 
remains to be seen as to what action can be proposed which affects the 
position, but not the enforcement rights, of the secured creditor. 
There are, however, certain circumstances in which the administrator 
does not need to convene an initial creditors’ meeting to consider his 
proposals. The administrator can dispense with the initial creditors’ 
meeting, and does not need to have his proposals approved, where his 
“statement of proposals states that [he] thinks that (a) the company has 
sufficient property to enable each creditor to be paid in full, (b) that the 
company has insufficient property to enable a distribution to be made to 
unsecured creditors . . . , or (c) that it is not reasonably practicable to res-
cue the company as a going concern or implement an alternative strategy 
which produces a better result for creditors than the winding up.”129 This 
authority to dispense with the need to summon an initial creditors’ meet-
ing was introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 and applies in circum-
stances where there is likely to be nothing of substance that a creditors’ 
meeting could decide. 
Even though the administrator is not required in these circumstances to 
summon a creditors’ meeting on his own initiative, he is required to do 
so if requested by creditors whose debts amount to at least ten percent of 
the total debts of the company. Where a creditors’ meeting is held, and 
the administrator has included in his statement of proposals that the 
debtor has insufficient property to enable it to make a distribution to un-
secured creditors, then the secured creditor is entitled vote in respect of 
the full value of his secured debt without deducting the value of his secu-
rity.130 
The English equivalent to the Chapter 11 plan of reorganization is con-
tained in separate statutory provisions in the Insolvency Act 1986 and the 
Companies Act 1985. A company voluntary arrangement (CVA) is made 
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 129. Id., c. 45, Schedule B1, para. 52(1). 
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pursuant to the provisions of Part I of the Insolvency Act 1986 and is a 
composition in satisfaction of the debtor’s debts or a scheme of arrange-
ments of its affairs resulting from acceptance of a proposal made to 
creditors. Such a proposal can be made by the directors of the debtor 
whether or not the debtor is insolvent or likely to become insolvent. It 
can also be proposed by an administrator, and the administrator’s pro-
posals, where necessary, can include a statement that the administrator 
intends to achieve the purpose of administration by proposing a CVA. 
Thus, a CVA may run in parallel with an administration, but, without 
an administration, the CVA process does not generate an automatic 
stay.131 For this reason, many CVAs are conducted within the framework 
of administration. The normal procedure in these circumstances is for the 
administrator to continue to manage the debtor until the CVA is ap-
proved. At that point, the administrator will pass over assets or trading 
surpluses to the supervisor of the CVA for distribution among creditors. 
Usually, the supervisor is the administrator himself. 
When a CVA proposal is made by an administrator, a creditors’ meet-
ing must be summoned, at which creditors vote on the CVA proposal. A 
creditor entitled to vote is bound by the CVA even if he did not receive 
notice of the meeting, or, having received notice of the meeting, he 
chooses not to attend or to vote by proxy. Thus, a creditor not entitled to 
vote is not bound by a CVA. The general rule is that every creditor who 
has notice of the creditors’ meeting is entitled to vote at the meeting. In 
order for the CVA to be approved, there must be a majority vote in ex-
cess of three-quarters of the creditors present (in person or by proxy). As 
with the administrator’s proposals, a meeting summoned to approve a 
CVA must not approve any proposal which “affects the right of the se-
cured creditor of the company to enforce his security, except with the 
concurrence of the creditor concerned.”132 
As an alternative to a company voluntary arrangement, an administra-
tor can propose a scheme of arrangement under section 425 of the Com-
panies Act of 1985. This section declares that where any compromise or 
arrangement is proposed between a company and its creditors, or any 
class of them, the court may order a meeting of the creditors to be called. 
Additionally, if three-fourths of creditors present either in person by 
proxy agree to the compromise or arrangement (and it is also sanctioned 
by the court), it will be binding on all the creditors and on the company. 
                                                                                                             
 131. Note there is separate moratorium proceeding available to small companies only, 
which does give rise that an automatic stay. 
 132. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 4(3). 
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Schemes of arrangement are binding only on those creditors who are 
made a party to the scheme. It is not necessary for the debtor to have a 
scheme of arrangement with all creditors. However, it is necessary for 
the debtor to identify the separate classes of creditors, and for each sepa-
rate class to approve the scheme by the requisite majority. There is no 
equivalent to the Chapter 11 concept of cram-down. Whereas a Chapter 
11 plan of reorganization can be confirmed even if a class of creditors 
votes against it (provided that the conditions to a cram-down contained 
in the Bankruptcy Code are satisfied), if a separate class of creditors 
votes against a scheme of arrangement they cannot be bound. The re-
sponsibility for determining what creditors are to be summoned to any 
meeting as constituting a separate class rests upon the debtor. If the 
meeting is incorrectly convened or constituted, or any objection is taken 
to the presence of any particular creditors as having interests competing 
with the others, the objection must be taken at this stage.133 A scheme of 
arrangement can relate to the debtor’s secured creditors, but secured 
creditors are likely to be a separate class (or perhaps classes) which can 
only be bound if the class votes by the requisite majority to support the 
scheme. Furthermore, in the context of an administration, it seems that a 
scheme cannot be proposed without the consent of all the secured credi-
tors, where the scheme affects the enforcement rights of secured credi-
tors. 
In order for the scheme to become effective, it must be sanctioned by 
the court at a hearing held after creditors have voted. Importantly, even 
though there is no statutory authority on this point, the court may ignore 
the fact that a class has not consented to the scheme if it is proved that 
upon an immediate distribution of the assets, none would be available for 
that class.134 It has been held that creditors’ meetings are unnecessary 
where a scheme involves no risk to them.135 Additionally, it has been 
held that where one class of creditors had voted against the scheme, and 
so was consequently not bound by it, the court could sanction the scheme 
in so far as it affected the remaining creditors who had voted in favor of 
                                                                                                             
 133. The classic test of what is a class for these purposes was laid down by Lord Jus-
tice Bowen in Sovereign Life Assurance v. Dodd, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573, 583 (C.A.), stating 
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Steam Navigation Co. [1939] 1 Ch. 41 (C.A.); In re Sorsbie [1904] 1 Ch. 12 (C.A.).  
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it.136 There is currently considerable controversy in England as to 
whether it is proper to value the debtor’s assets on a break up or liquida-
tion basis, rather than on the basis of a going concern enterprise value 
when determining whether a class of creditors, including secured credi-
tors, has an interest in the assets of the debtor and would be entitled to a 
distribution therefrom.137 
2. The Cram-Down of Secured Creditors Under Chapter 11138 
Confirmation of a plan of reorganization is the statutory goal of every 
Chapter 11 case. Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code provides the re-
quirements for such confirmation, containing Congress’s minimum re-
quirements for allowing an entity to discharge its unpaid debts and con-
tinue its operations. These requirements are numerous, and differ de-
pending on whether confirmation is consensual or not. If consensual con-
firmation is sought, section 1129(a) governs. It contains thirteen para-
graphs, each of which contains a separate requirement that must be met 
in order to confirm the plan. Among the critical requirements are the best 
interest of creditors test and the feasibility test. 
If non-consensual confirmation is sought, then section 1129(b) con-
trols, which incorporates all but one of the paragraphs of section 1129(a). 
It adopts twelve of the thirteen section 1129(a) requirements, omitting 
only the requirement that all classes consent or be unimpaired. In addi-
tion, section 1129(b) adds two more requirements. First, the plan may not 
unfairly discriminate against dissenting classes. Second, the plan’s treat-
ment of such dissenting classes must be fair and equitable. 
Before the court hears evidence on these matters, however, much will 
have happened. The plan proponent will have drafted and disseminated a 
disclosure statement approved by the court regarding the effect of the 
plan. The creditors and interest holders will have been solicited for their 
votes, and will have voted. Parties in interest will have filed any objec-
tions they may have. Only after this large amount of work has been done 
will the court then allow the proponent to demonstrate that its plan de-
serves confirmation. 
Although section 1129(b)(1) sets out a complete test for non-
consensual confirmation, Congress added a subsection to illustrate some 
of the components of the fair and equitable rule. This section has re-
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ceived the lion’s share of judicial attention, representing a carefully de-
lineated explanation of various types of fair and equitable treatment. The 
preamble to section 1129(b)(2) states that “[f]or the purpose of this sub-
section, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a 
class includes the following requirements.” What follows is an extensive 
list of possible non-consensual treatments of secured and unsecured 
creditors, and of interest holders. 
The first subparagraph of section 1129(b)(2) states that it applies with 
respect to a class of “secured claims.” Under the Code, a secured claim is 
one that is either “secured by a lien on property in which the estate has 
an interest” or one that is “subject to setoff under section 553.”139 The 
amount of the claim secured is limited “to the extent of the value of such 
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property,” or “to the ex-
tent of the amount subject to setoff.” There are three possible situations 
which involve a class of secured claims. First, a creditor may have col-
lateral that is worth more that the amount of its allowed claim. For ex-
ample, a creditor may have a claim of $50 secured by collateral having a 
value of $75. In this case, the creditor has one claim, and it is a secured 
claim of $50. In addition, a creditor might also have taken security pre-
bankruptcy which has subsequently become worthless. If the claim was 
$50, and the value of the collateral is now zero, the creditor has one 
claim, but it is unsecured and will not be subject to section 
1129(b)(2)(A). A final example is representative of most litigated cases, 
where a creditor may have a claim in excess of the value of its collateral. 
To reverse the prior example, the claim may be for $75, and be secured 
by a lien on property worth only $50. In this case, the creditor has two 
claims: a secured claim for $50, and an unsecured claim for the defi-
ciency for $25. Only the secured claim will be subject to section 
1129(b)(2)(A). 
Section 1129(b)(2)(A) lists three possible treatments of a secured 
claim, any one of which will independently satisfy the fair and equitable 
requirement. First, the plan proponent may seek to satisfy the claim in 
full by giving the creditor a note in the amount of the secured claim se-
cured by the same collateral. Second, the plan proponent may also seek 
to sell the collateral free of the lien, and transfer the lien to the proceeds 
of sale. Third, the proponent may seek to give the creditor the “indubita-
ble equivalent” of its claim. 
Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) provides the terms under which the plan pro-
ponent may unilaterally write a new loan. First, the holder of the claim 
must “retain the lien securing [its] claims” regardless of who winds up 
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with the property. Secondly, the holder of the claim must “receive on 
account of such claim deferred cash payments totalling at least the al-
lowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the 
plan, of at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest 
in such property.” The primary issue litigated under section 
1129(b)(2)(A)(i) is the appropriate interest rate that the deferred pay-
ments will bear. As indicated in the legislative history, if the interest rate 
is a “market rate,” then the principal of the note needs only to equal the 
allowed amount of the claim. If the plan proponent chooses a rate which 
is less that the “market” rate, then the stream of payments will not have a 
present value equal to the allowed amount of the claim. There is no re-
quirement that the lender’s pre-petition security agreement or mortgage 
be used in order for the lender to retain its lien. As noted by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: “We interpret the plan as ensuring [reten-
tion of a lien] if the debtor fails to comply with its debt service obliga-
tions, [the secured creditor] would have the right to foreclose.”140 
Many loans amortize between the date of issue and maturity; that is, 
they call for payments which, if timely made, will leave a zero principal 
balance at maturity. A reorganized debtor’s projected cash flow, how-
ever, may not support a fully amortizing loan. The legislative history 
suggests that balloon payments may be appropriate, or that a plan may 
adopt non-standard repayment schedules adapted to the reorganized 
debtor’s business needs. The secured creditor’s protection here is the fea-
sibility requirement of section 1129(a)(11). If the plan calls for minus-
cule payments for twenty years, and a balloon payment on resale at the 
end of that period, then plan’s feasibility, and possibly good faith, could 
be called into question. 
A second example of fair and equitable treatment is contained in sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). It provides that a plan is fair and equitable as to a 
secured creditor if the plan provides for the sale, subject to section 
363(k), of any property that is subject to the liens securing such claims, 
free and clear of such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of 
such sale, and the treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or 
(iii) of that subparagraph. This clause anticipates six components: (1) a 
sale; (2) subject to section 363(k); (3) of property subject to the lien; (4) 
which sale is free and clear of the liens; (5) with the liens to attach to the 
proceeds; and (6) deferred payments or indubitable equivalent. 
The plan must anticipate a sale, either contained in the plan itself, or 
post-confirmation. Inclusion of the sale in the plan is not troublesome, as 
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section 1123 expressly anticipates that a sale of all or some assets can be 
a means to implement the plan. 
The sale must be subject to section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
This section provides that “unless the court for cause orders otherwise 
the holder of [the secured] claim may bid at such sale, and, if the holder 
of such claim purchases such property, such holder may offset such 
claim against the purchase price of such property.” This gives the se-
cured creditor protections against attempts to sell the collateral too 
cheaply. If the secured party thinks the collateral is worth more than the 
debtor is selling it for, it may effectively bid its debt and take title to the 
property. 
The final option under section 1129(b)(2)(A) is that a plan may be con-
firmed against a secured creditor’s wishes if the plan provides “for the 
realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such claims.” 
Two examples will illustrate the operation of this provision. First, aban-
donment (or other unqualified transfer) of the collateral to the secured 
creditor satisfies this requirement. Second, provision of a payment 
stream with a present value less than the allowed amount of the claim 
will not suffice. Third, plans which call for substitute collateral, although 
contemplated by the legislative history of the Code, have also been dis-
favored unless the creditor receives a “substitute of the most indubitable 
equivalence,” providing for present value and safety of principal. In 
cases of this sort, whether the substitute collateral’s value exceeds the 
allowed secured claim is critical. Plans which propose to give an overse-
cured creditor no payments for a period followed by transfer if the collat-
eral is not sold by a certain time, however, have met with favor so long 
as the court is satisfied that there will always be more value in the prop-
erty than the lender’s lien. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The secured creditor is still treated differently in U.K. and U.S. res-
cue/reorganisation proceedings. While the law in both jurisdictions has 
changed and continues to change in ways that bring the two systems 
closer together—in large part because of the changing role and concep-
tion of the rescue/reorganisation proceeding itself—the secured credi-
tor’s position is significantly stronger in the United Kingdom.  
The administration procedure pays considerable deference to the 
wishes and interests of the secured creditor, first by allowing the holder 
of a qualifying floating charge to control key aspects of the case (the law 
allows such a secured creditor to commence an administration without a 
court application, to trump the company’s choice of administrator if the 
company files for administration, and requires the administration to be 
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conducted for the benefit of the secured creditor—by realizing the com-
pany’s property to make a distribution to the secured creditor where nei-
ther a rescue nor a restructuring that achieves a better recovery than a 
liquidation are reasonably practicable) and secondly by immunising him 
from the adverse effects of the procedure (by ensuring that the adminis-
trator’s proposals and any CVA proposed by the administrator cannot 
affect his right to enforce his security).  
While the Chapter 11 regime provides substantial protections for pre-
petition secured creditors, the nature of the process, even after the 2005 
reforms, means that secured creditors have significantly less control than 
in administration proceedings, are forced to be more active in and to liti-
gate over the protection of their rights and outcomes are less predictable, 
in large part because of litigation risk. 
Furthermore, the difference in deference applies not only in the  
debtor—secured creditor relationship but also at the level of the inter-
creditor relationship—a key pressure point in most large rescue and reor-
ganisation proceedings. In the United Kingdom, the rights, freedom of 
action, and position of senior creditors have been well respected and pro-
tected although the extent of these protections (particularly in light of the 
complex financing structures with multiple tiers of secured debt and in-
ter-creditor agreements) may well come to be tested in the next, perhaps 
more litigious and U.S.-style, era of restructurings. 
